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The beneficial effect of common ownership: Evidence from bank liquidity creation

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  • Khoo, Joye
  • Zheng, Chen
  • Pathan, Shams

Abstract

We argue a positive association between common ownership and liquidity creation because common ownership increases risk-absorption capacity through higher profit margins, greater equity capital, and improved disclosure quality. Accordingly, we find solid evidence that banks with greater common ownership create 3.56%–4.54% more liquidity. The beneficial effect on liquidity creation is dominant for banks with high risk-absorption capacities, enhanced disclosure quality, low competition, greater long-term shareholdings, and low performance-sensitive managerial incentives, substantiating our theoretical conjectures and establishing five significant channels. Finally, we show that banks have incentive to create more liquidity when they have significant co-ownerships among themselves. Our main findings remain robust to multiple proxies, alternative specifications, and three methods to address endogeneity concerns – difference-in-differences based on the Blackrock–Barclays Global Investors merger in 2009, two-stage least squares analysis with instrumental variables based on Russell 2000 index inclusion, and propensity score matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Khoo, Joye & Zheng, Chen & Pathan, Shams, 2024. "The beneficial effect of common ownership: Evidence from bank liquidity creation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:163:y:2024:i:c:s037842662400089x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107172
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common ownership; Liquidity creation; Disclosure quality; Managerial incentives; Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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