IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v154y2023ics0378426623000845.html

Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?

Author

Listed:
  • El Ghoul, Sadok
  • Guedhami, Omrane
  • Wei, Zuobao
  • Zhu, Yicheng

Abstract

Using U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) data on corruption convictions of government officials, we study the effect of public corruption on analyst forecast quality. We find that analyst earnings forecasts for firms headquartered in more corrupt states are less accurate. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks and several alternative corruption measures. In our cross-sectional analysis, we find that the negative effect of corruption on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced in government contractor firms and firms with weaker internal governance or external monitoring. We further identify two channels through which corruption negatively influences analyst forecast accuracy: Firms in more corrupt states exhibit lower earnings quality and issue less frequent management guidance.

Suggested Citation

  • El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Wei, Zuobao & Zhu, Yicheng, 2023. "Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0378426623000845
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106860
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426623000845
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106860?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    2. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
    3. Rafael Di Tella & Alberto Ades, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September.
    4. Huang, Qianqian & Yuan, Tao, 2021. "Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 213-248, February.
    5. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-392, May.
    6. Hou, Qingsong & Li, Weifang & Teng, Min & Hu, May, 2022. "Just a short-lived glory?The effect of China's anti-corruption on the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    7. Ivan Montiel & Bryan W. Husted & Petra Christmann, 2012. "Using private management standard certification to reduce information asymmetries in corrupt environments," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9), pages 1103-1113, September.
    8. Ellis, Jesse & Smith, Jared & White, Roger, 2020. "Corruption and Corporate Innovation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(7), pages 2124-2149, November.
    9. Hao Liang & Luc Renneboog, 2017. "On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(2), pages 853-910, April.
    10. Daniel Lederman & Norman V. Loayza & Rodrigo R. Soares, 2005. "Accountability And Corruption: Political Institutions Matter," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-35, March.
    11. Nishant Dass & Vikram Nanda & Steven Chong Xiao, 2016. "Public Corruption in the United States: Implications for Local Firms," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(1), pages 102-138.
    12. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-338, May.
    13. Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2014. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2456-2481, August.
    14. Liu, Tingting & Liu, Yu & Ullah, Barkat & Wei, Zuobao & Xu, Lixin Colin, 2021. "The dark side of transparency in developing countries: The link between financial reporting practices and corruption," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    15. Wei Jiang, 2017. "Have Instrumental Variables Brought Us Closer to the Truth," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(2), pages 127-140.
    16. Diaby, Aboubacar & Sylwester, Kevin, 2015. "Corruption and Market Competition: Evidence from Post-Communist Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 487-499.
    17. Hongkang Xu & Mai Dao & Alex Petkevich, 2019. "Political Corruption and Auditor Behavior: Evidence from US Firms," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 513-540, May.
    18. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    19. Chung, Richard & Firth, Michael & Kim, Jeong-Bon, 2002. "Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 29-48, January.
    20. Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, 2009. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 1985-2021, October.
    21. Womack, Kent L, 1996. "Do Brokerage Analysts' Recommendations Have Investment Value?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 137-167, March.
    22. Degeorge, Francois & Patel, Jayendu & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-33, January.
    23. Roger K. Loh & René M. Stulz, 2011. "When Are Analyst Recommendation Changes Influential?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(2), pages 593-627.
    24. Herzfeld, Thomas & Weiss, Christoph, 2003. "Corruption and legal (in)effectiveness: an empirical investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 621-632, September.
    25. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    26. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    27. Joseph Kalmenovitz, 2021. "Incentivizing Financial Regulators," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(10), pages 4745-4784.
    28. Nadia Fiorino & Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, 2015. "How long does it take for government decentralization to affect corruption?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 273-305, August.
    29. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, June.
    30. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
    31. Rosenstein, Stuart & Wyatt, Jeffrey G., 1990. "Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 175-191, August.
    32. Chen, Yunsen & Xie, Yuan & You, Hong & Zhang, Yanan, 2018. "Does crackdown on corruption reduce stock price crash risk? Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 125-141.
    33. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2000. "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 847-904.
    34. Mark H. Lang & Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, 2003. "ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value?," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(2), pages 317-345, May.
    35. Orie E. Barron & Charles O. Kile & Terrence B. O'Keefe, 1999. "MD&A Quality as Measured by the SEC and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(1), pages 75-109, March.
    36. Li, Nian & Xu, Nianhang & Dong, Rui & Chan, Kam C. & Lin, Xiaowei, 2021. "Does an anti-corruption campaign increase analyst earnings forecast optimism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    37. Glaeser, Edward L. & Saks, Raven E., 2006. "Corruption in America," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1053-1072, August.
    38. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    39. Randall Holcombe & Christopher Boudreaux, 2015. "Regulation and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 75-85, July.
    40. Clement, Michael B., 1999. "Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity matter?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 285-303, July.
    41. García, Diego & Norli, Øyvind, 2012. "Geographic dispersion and stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 547-565.
    42. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
    43. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
    44. Smith, Jared D., 2016. "US political corruption and firm financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 350-367.
    45. Hoi, Chun Keung(Stan) & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2019. "Does social capital mitigate agency problems? Evidence from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 498-519.
    46. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    47. Nguyen, Nam H. & Phan, Hieu V. & Simpson, Thuy, 2020. "Political corruption and mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    48. Gu, Zhaoyang & Wu, Joanna Shuang, 2003. "Earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 5-29, April.
    49. Kunicová, Jana & Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 2005. "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(4), pages 573-606, October.
    50. Eitan Goldman & Jörg Rocholl & Jongil So, 2013. "Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1617-1648.
    51. Hongkang Xu & Mai Dao & Jia Wu, 2019. "The effect of local political corruption on earnings quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 551-574, August.
    52. Alan D. Crane & Sébastien Michenaud & James P. Weston, 2016. "Editor's Choice The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(6), pages 1377-1408.
    53. Cochrane, John H., 2005. "The risk and return of venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 3-52, January.
    54. Danling Jiang & Alok Kumar & Kelvin K. F. Law, 2016. "Political contributions and analyst behavior," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 37-88, March.
    55. Hongping Tan & Shiheng Wang & Michael Welker, 2011. "Analyst Following and Forecast Accuracy After Mandated IFRS Adoptions," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 49(5), pages 1307-1357, December.
    56. Appel, Ian R. & Gormley, Todd A. & Keim, Donald B., 2016. "Passive investors, not passive owners," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 111-141.
    57. Mehmet Bac, 2001. "Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 87-96, April.
    58. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
    59. Nerissa C. Brown & Jared D. Smith & Roger M. White & Chad J. Zutter, 2021. "Political Corruption and Firm Value in the U.S.: Do Rents and Monitoring Matter?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 168(2), pages 335-351, January.
    60. Hossain, Ashrafee Tanvir & Hossain, Takdir & Kryzanowski, Lawrence, 2021. "Political corruption and corporate payouts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    61. Jere R. Francis & Stevanie S. Neuman & Nathan J. Newton, 2019. "Does Tax Planning Affect Analysts' Forecast Accuracy?†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(4), pages 2663-2694, December.
    62. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    63. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    64. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    65. Charles JP Chen & Yuan Ding & Chansog (Francis) Kim, 2010. "High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(9), pages 1505-1524, December.
    66. Mikhail, MB & Walther, BR & Willis, RH, 1997. "Do security analysts improve their performance with experience?," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35, pages 131-157.
    67. Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2008. "Weathering Corruption," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(4), pages 667-681, November.
    68. Amy P. Hutton & Lian Fen Lee & Susan Z. Shu, 2012. "Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 50(5), pages 1217-1244, December.
    69. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    70. Cowan, Arnold R. & Salotti, Valentina, 2020. "Anti-selective disclosure regulation and analyst forecast accuracy and usefulness," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    71. Ole†Kristian Hope, 2003. "Accounting Policy Disclosures and Analysts' Forecasts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(2), pages 295-321, June.
    72. Allen H. Huang & Reuven Lehavy & Amy Y. Zang & Rong Zheng, 2018. "Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles: A Topic Modeling Approach," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2833-2855, June.
    73. Filipe R. Campante & Quoc-Anh Do, 2014. "Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(8), pages 2456-2481, August.
    74. Emerson, Patrick M., 2006. "Corruption, competition and democracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 193-212, October.
    75. Dahya, Jay & McConnell, John J., 2005. "Outside directors and corporate board decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-60, March.
    76. Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December.
    77. Kotera, Go & Okada, Keisuke & Samreth, Sovannroeun, 2012. "Government size, democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2340-2348.
    78. Alexander W. Butler & Larry Fauver & Sandra Mortal, 2009. "Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2673-2705, July.
    79. Loh, Roger K. & Mian, G. Mujtaba, 2006. "Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior investment recommendations?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 455-483, May.
    80. Ashrafee Tanvir Hossain & Lawrence Kryzanowski, 2021. "Political corruption shielding and corporate acquisitions," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 55-83, February.
    81. Fisman, Raymond & Svensson, Jakob, 2007. "Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 63-75, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Yihong & Pan, Xingyu & Yuan, Na & Zheng, Xinwei, 2025. "How does political relationship building affect market efficiency? Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    2. Liu, Beibei & Li, Tingting & Li, Chuntao & Zhao, Yi, 2025. "Regional integrity and corporate investment efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    3. Yunqi Fan & Yanwei Zhang, 2024. "Consequences of firm-specific stock price crashes on analyst forecasts: Evidence from China," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, December.
    4. Song, Yingying & Chen, Xinxin, 2025. "Which opinion is more trustworthy: An analysts’ earnings forecast quality assessment framework based on machine learning," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    5. Wang, Zhao & He, Yali & Jiang, Tianqi, 2024. "Does the gender composition of local governments matter for firms’ information environment? Evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    6. Kaakeh, Abdulkader & Parker, Simon C., 2025. "The impact of public corruption on marketplace lending outcomes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    7. Mia Hang Pham & Harvey Nguyen & Martin Young & Anh Dao, 2024. "Who Keeps Company with the Wolf will Learn to Howl: Does Local Corruption Culture Affect Financial Adviser Misconduct?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 185-210, September.
    8. Li, Shu & Zhang, Xiaoyun, 2025. "Can digital transformation of enterprise improve the information environment of the capital market? ——Evidence from Analyst's perspective," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zuobao Wei & Yicheng Zhu, 2023. "Does religiosity improve analyst forecast accuracy?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 915-948, April.
    2. Huang, Rui & Jiang, Xuejun & Li, Leonard Leye & Lu, Louise Yi & Yu, Yangxin, 2025. "The impact of local corruption on firms' narrative R&D disclosures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Du, Qingjie & Heo, Yuna, 2022. "Political corruption, Dodd–Frank whistleblowing, and corporate investment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Hongkang Xu & Mai Dao & Jia Wu, 2019. "The effect of local political corruption on earnings quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 551-574, August.
    5. Zuobao Wei & Yicheng Zhu, 2023. "Public corruption and the allocation of government contracts," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 3-22, January.
    6. Yang, Hao & Zhang, Qiusheng & Zhao, Xiaofang & Wang, Zhongchao, 2022. "Does political corruption affect mergers and acquisitions decisions? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 248-266.
    7. Hinh Khieu & Nam H. Nguyen & Hieu V. Phan & Jon A. Fulkerson, 2023. "Political Corruption and Corporate Risk-Taking," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 93-113, April.
    8. Du, Qingjie & Hasan, Iftekhar & Wang, Yang & Wei, K.C. John, 2025. "Political corruption, Dodd–Frank whistleblowing, and debt financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    9. Ahsan Habib & Mabel D' Costa & Ahmed Khamis Al‐Hadi, 2023. "Consequences of local social norms: A review of the literature in accounting, finance, and corporate governance," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(1), pages 3-45, March.
    10. Hossain, Ashrafee Tanvir & Hossain, Takdir & Kryzanowski, Lawrence, 2021. "Political corruption and corporate payouts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    11. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    12. Krisztina Kis-Katos & Günther G. Schulze, 2013. "Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 27(1), pages 79-109, May.
    13. Chen, Xia & Jiang, Xuejun & Lu, Louise Yi & Yu, Yangxin, 2021. "Local political corruption and Firm's non-GAAP reporting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    14. Hassan, M. Kabir & Karim, Md. Sydul & Kozlowski, Steven E., 2022. "Implications of public corruption for local firms: Evidence from corporate debt maturity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    15. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar, 2007. "Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 46(4), pages 751-764.
    16. Cintra, Renato Fabiano & Cassol, Alessandra & Ribeiro, Ivano & de Carvalho, Antonio Oliveira, 2018. "Corruption and emerging markets: Systematic review of the most cited," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 607-619.
    17. Nguyen, Nam H. & Phan, Hieu V. & Simpson, Thuy, 2020. "Political corruption and mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    18. Mia Hang Pham & Harvey Nguyen & Martin Young & Anh Dao, 2024. "Who Keeps Company with the Wolf will Learn to Howl: Does Local Corruption Culture Affect Financial Adviser Misconduct?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 185-210, September.
    19. Joël Cariolle & Petros G Sekeris, 2021. "How export shocks corrupt: theory and evidence," Working Papers hal-03164648, HAL.
    20. Ucar, Erdem & Staer, Arsenio, 2020. "Local corruption and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 266-282.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0378426623000845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.