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Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?

Author

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  • El Ghoul, Sadok
  • Guedhami, Omrane
  • Wei, Zuobao
  • Zhu, Yicheng

Abstract

Using U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) data on corruption convictions of government officials, we study the effect of public corruption on analyst forecast quality. We find that analyst earnings forecasts for firms headquartered in more corrupt states are less accurate. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks and several alternative corruption measures. In our cross-sectional analysis, we find that the negative effect of corruption on analyst forecast accuracy is more pronounced in government contractor firms and firms with weaker internal governance or external monitoring. We further identify two channels through which corruption negatively influences analyst forecast accuracy: Firms in more corrupt states exhibit lower earnings quality and issue less frequent management guidance.

Suggested Citation

  • El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Wei, Zuobao & Zhu, Yicheng, 2023. "Does public corruption affect analyst forecast quality?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0378426623000845
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106860
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    Keywords

    Public corruption; Analyst forecast quality; Information asymmetry; U.S. States;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation

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