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Is quality accreditation effective? Evidence from the childcare market

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  • Xiao, Mo

Abstract

The ineffectiveness of a quality accreditation mechanism can be attributed to the inability of the accreditation status to provide consumers with information they do not already possess. I present a structural model of demand allowing consumers to infer quality from both accreditation status and firm reputation. I then estimate this model to assess the effectiveness and the impact of the national accreditation system for childcare centers on consumer welfare. My results suggest that disregarding the endogeneity of firms' accreditation choices significantly underestimates the effectiveness of the accreditation system. However, on average consumers do not gain much information beyond what they have inferred from a firm's reputation. The estimates of structural parameters are then used to quantify the value of this information to consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao, Mo, 2010. "Is quality accreditation effective? Evidence from the childcare market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 708-721, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:6:p:708-721
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    Cited by:

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    2. Brown, Jessica H. & Herbst, Chris M., 2023. "Minimum Wage, Worker Quality, and Consumer Well-Being: Evidence from the Child Care Market," IZA Discussion Papers 16257, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Samuel Berlinski & Maria Marta Ferreyra & Luca Flabbi & Juan David Martin, 2020. "Child Care Markets, Parental Labor Supply, and Child Development," CHILD Working Papers Series 73 JEL Classification:, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    4. Camehl, Georg F. & Schober, Pia S. & Spiess, C. Katharina, 2018. "Information asymmetries between parents and educators in German childcare institutions," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Latest Ar, pages 1-23.
    5. Alexander E. Saak, 2017. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 309-335, June.
    6. Fesselmeyer, Eric, 2018. "The value of green certification in the Singapore housing market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 36-39.
    7. Astrid Pennerstorfer & Dieter Pennerstorfer, 2018. "How Small are Small Markets? Location Choice and Geographical Market Size for Child Care Services," Economics working papers 2018-14, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    8. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2013. "Learning Models: An Assessment of Progress, Challenges and New Developments," Economics Papers 2013-W07, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    9. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "Delegation of quality control in value chains:," IFPRI discussion papers 1526, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. Saak, Alexander E., 2016. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control and Market Size with an Application to Kyrgyzstan Dairy," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235707, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    11. Mihaela Schaar & Simpson Zhang, 2015. "A dynamic model of certification and reputation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 509-541, April.
    12. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
    13. Ali, Umair & Brown, Jessica H. & Herbst, Chris M., 2022. "Secure Communities as Immigration Enforcement: How Secure Is the Child Care Market?," IZA Discussion Papers 15821, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Huebener, Mathias & Pape, Astrid & Spiess, C. Katharina, 2020. "Parental labour supply responses to the abolition of day care fees," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 510-543.
    15. Andrew T. Ching & Tülin Erdem & Michael P. Keane, 2013. "Invited Paper ---Learning Models: An Assessment of Progress, Challenges, and New Developments," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(6), pages 913-938, November.

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