Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case Of Multiattribute Products With Heterogeneous Consumers
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- V. Joseph Hotz & Mo Xiao, 2006. "Strategic Information Disclosure: The Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers," NBER Working Papers 11937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Seth Freedman & Melissa Kearney & Mara Lederman, 2012.
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More about this item
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
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