A competitive carbon emissions scheme with hybrid fiscal incentives: The evidence from a taxi industry

As two major approaches to reduce carbon emissions, command-and-control instruments and market-based carbon trading systems have their own weaknesses. Our paper first proposes a type of endogenous equilibrium methodology to dynamically derive the industrial carbon emissions standards. At the equilibrium, the sum of all carbon assets and liabilities is zero in the considered industry. Moreover, the standards fall over time with low-carbon technological advance. Most importantly, combining Pigou's and Coase's ideas, we construct a fiscal instrument accounting for both carbon taxes and allowances based on the dynamically improved emissions standards and carbon trading prices. This “No revenue for government” method implements a self-operated ecology for carbon trading market. Finally, considering the “Waterloo” recession of carbon prices, we introduce an adjustment factor into the model, which generates a negative-feedback mechanism with carbon prices. To support our idea, we present the application to Beijing taxi industry in detail and raise relative policy implications based on the evidence.