Temporary contracts, employment protection and skill: A simple model
We construct a theoretical labor market that incorporates skill differences across workers to identify under which conditions temporary contracts are a way to access to permanency. Firing costs and unemployment benefits increase the threshold productivity above which workers access to permanency.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wasmer, Etienne, 1999.
"Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 349-371, July.
- Etienne Wasmer, 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," Working Papers 97-15, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Wasmer, E., 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," DELTA Working Papers 97-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- E Wasmer, 1997. "Competition for Jobs in a Growing Economy and the Emergence of Dualism," CEP Discussion Papers dp0369, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.