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The influence of family and pyramidal ownership on corporate diversification in Chile

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  • Espinosa-Méndez, Christian
  • Jara-Bertín, Mauricio
  • Maquieira, Carlos

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the moderating effects of family nature and pyramidal ownership on the relationship between corporate diversification and performance in Chilean companies. Using a sample of 104 companies listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange between 2005 and 2016, we report a diversification discount. Second, we find that when firms are owned by a family, the relationship between performance and diversification is positive. However, when family ownership is pyramidal, the relationship between performance and diversification becomes negative.

Suggested Citation

  • Espinosa-Méndez, Christian & Jara-Bertín, Mauricio & Maquieira, Carlos, 2018. "The influence of family and pyramidal ownership on corporate diversification in Chile," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 158-168.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:43:y:2018:i:c:p:158-168
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.10.012
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    2. Shah, Muhammad Hashim & Xiao, Zuoping & Abdullah, & Quresh, Shakir & Ahmad, Mushtaq, 2020. "Internal pyramid structure, contract enforcement, minority investor protection, and firms’ performance: Evidence from emerging economies," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family firms; Pyramidal ownership; Corporate diversification; Firm value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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