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Connected national capital: Corporations in colonial and independent Egypt

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  • Artunç, Cihan
  • Saleh, Mohamed

Abstract

We use a newly assembled dataset covering all Egyptian corporations, their founders, and political officeholders, to demonstrate the differential impact of political connections on firm performance across two distinctive political and economic contexts. Before Egypt’s independence in 1922, political connections reduced firm profitability, as connected firms were perceived to be aligned with the anti-colonial, nationalist movement, unsettling investors. After independence, connections improved firm outcomes by granting preferential access to incorporation and shielding connected companies from competition. These dynamics reflect the shift from a laissez-faire colonial regime to a nationalist industrial policy that selectively favored politically connected firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Artunç, Cihan & Saleh, Mohamed, 2026. "Connected national capital: Corporations in colonial and independent Egypt," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:180:y:2026:i:c:s0304387825002482
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103697
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F54 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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