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Measuring the extent and implications of corporate political connections in prewar Japan

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  • Tetsuji Okazaki
  • Michiru Sawada

Abstract

This paper explores the extent of political connections of firms, and examines their implications on firm values, using firm-level data from prewar Japan. We collect the data of directors, their positions in the House of Representatives, stock prices and financial performance, on publicly traded companies in late 1920s and early 1930s Japan. It is found that almost 20% of the publicly traded companies had political connections through politician directors. Especially, firms in the regulated industries such as the electric power and railroad, were more likely to have political connections. Overall, there is no evidence that connections with politics added firm values. On the other hand, with respect to those firms that newly obtained political connections, we found that the stock returns improved from the pre-election period to the post-election period.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2016. "Measuring the extent and implications of corporate political connections in prewar Japan," CIGS Working Paper Series 16-003E, The Canon Institute for Global Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:cnn:wpaper:16-003e
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    Cited by:

    1. Grossman, Richard S. & Imai, Masami, 2016. "Taking the lord's name in vain: The impact of connected directors on 19th century British banks," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 75-93.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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