Corporate political activities and firms' carbon emissions

This study investigates the relationship between corporate political activities (CPA) and a firm's carbon emissions level. We test two competing hypotheses suggesting that political connections either incentivize firms toward stricter environmental standards through reputational pressures or enable higher emissions via regulatory leniency and compromised governance. Utilizing a large sample of U.S. firms, we find robust evidence that politically connected firms have significantly higher carbon emissions. Specifically, adding one politically connected independent director increases absolute emissions by approximately 20% and emission intensity by 16%. These results remain consistent after extensive robustness checks and addressing endogeneity through a stacked difference-in-differences design around director turnover events. We further identify regulatory leniency and weakened environmental governance as mechanisms driving these higher emissions. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the CPA-emissions relationship is stronger in politically conservative states, financially constrained firms, competitive industries, and complex organizations, whereas institutional investors help mitigate this effect. Our findings highlight how corporate political strategies exacerbate environmental externalities, contributing to the understanding of the broader ecological and societal consequences of firms' nonmarket behaviors.