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Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry

Listed author(s):
  • Vivoda Vlado

    (Griffith University)

Registered author(s):

    This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes.

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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 1-36

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:13:y:2011:i:4:n:3
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