IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/buspol/v9y2007i2n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in Leverage between the Government and the World Bank

Author

Listed:
  • Gould John A

    (Colorado College)

  • Winters Matthew S

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

This paper applies the insights of obsolescing bargaining theory to a situation in which a host country interacted with both multinational corporations and an international organization, the World Bank. Drawing on resource curse literature and the Rubinstein bargaining model, we demonstrate the continued usefulness of obsolescing bargaining theory by explaining why the World Bank had to renegotiate its initial bargain with Chad in the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project. The paper explores how specific bargaining parameters changed over time in this case and suggests how resource curse dynamics and their impact on domestic politics might be particularly relevant for bargaining between host countries and international actors. The case study serves as a warning to international financial institutions and corporations alike with regard to the ways in which obsolescing bargains can arise in the contemporary global political-economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gould John A & Winters Matthew S, 2007. "An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in Leverage between the Government and the World Bank," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 1-36, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:9:y:2007:i:2:n:4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap.2007.9.2/bap.2007.9.2.1199/bap.2007.9.2.1199.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:worbus:v:53:y:2018:i:1:p:15-26 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Vivoda Vlado, 2011. "Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(4), pages 1-36, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:9:y:2007:i:2:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.