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The Economic Consequences of Accidents at Work

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  • Gabriele Mazzolini

Abstract

This paper investigates the economic consequences of workplace accidents in the British labour market. For the empirical analysis, I use data on employment and earnings from the British Household Panel Survey and exploit fixed effects estimators to control for time‐invariant unobserved workers’ characteristics. I provide evidence that accidents at work negatively affect both job opportunities and workers’ earnings. First, employment probabilities following a state of injury are significantly lower. This effect persists over time and is stronger in those regions where unemployment rate is higher. Second, a serious workplace accident also results in significant delayed wage penalties, which increase with the accident's seriousness.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Mazzolini, 2020. "The Economic Consequences of Accidents at Work," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 82(5), pages 1068-1093, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:82:y:2020:i:5:p:1068-1093
    DOI: 10.1111/obes.12358
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. F. Angei, 2025. "Silent alarms: workplace injuries under-reporting in Italy," Working Paper CRENoS 202503, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    2. Depalo, Domenico, 2023. "Should the Daylight Saving Time be abolished? Evidence from work accidents in Italy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    3. Galizzi, Monica & Leombruni, Roberto & Pacelli, Lia, 2023. "Severe work disabilities and long-lasting losses," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    4. Brown, Donna & Wadsworth, Jonathan, 2022. "Accidents will happen: (de)regulation of health and safety legislation, workplace accidents and self employment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117890, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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