IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Competitive Screening of a Heterogeneous Labor Force and Corporate Teamwork Attitude

  • Tymula, Agnieszka

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of competition on the structure of incentive schemes, workforce composition and the degree of cooperation within firms. We show that in equilibrium high-ability workers, in order to distinguish themselves from the less able workforce, choose the incentive schemes that strongly rely on their own as well as their teammates' performance. They work harder on their own task and are more team-oriented than less skilled workers. Our paper stresses the sorting role of the incentives and provides a rationale for the emergence of different corporate teamwork practices.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Sydney, School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013-18.

in new window

Date of creation: Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9543
Contact details of provider: Postal: Sydney, NSW 2006
Phone: 61 +2 9351 5055
Fax: 61 +2 9351 4341
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk, 2011. "Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 556-90, April.
  2. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," IAST Working Papers 12-03, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Mar 2013.
  3. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
  4. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model," Munich Reprints in Economics 20657, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Mas, Alexandre & Moretti, Enrico, 2006. "Peers at Work," IZA Discussion Papers 2292, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Kremer, M & Maskin, E, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," Working papers 96-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Tzioumis, Konstantinos, 2008. "Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 100-111, October.
  8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
  9. Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Individual or team decision-making - Causes and consequences of self-selection," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-31, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  10. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  11. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "The Power of Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 410-414, May.
  12. Kosfeld, Michael & von Siemens, Ferdinand, 2007. "Competition, Cooperation, and Corporate Culture," IZA Discussion Papers 2927, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Rafael Rob & Peter Zemsky, 2002. "Social Capital, Corporate Culture, and Incentive Intensity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 243-257, Summer.
  14. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
  15. Eriksson, Tor & Teyssier, Sabrina & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 1983, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  16. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-36, May.
  17. Che,Y.K. & Yoo,S.W., 1998. "Optimal incentives for teams," Working papers 8, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9543. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vanessa Holcombe)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.