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The effect of employee share ownership on employee commitment and turnover: comparing the cases in Britain and South Korea and the role of the economy

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  • Yeongjoon Yoon
  • Sukanya Sengupta

Abstract

Despite the consensus in the employee share ownership (ESO) literature for the need to explore contexts that influence ESO outcomes, studies examining two important factors, national context and status of the economy, are limited. In this study, the authors compare the outcomes of ESOs in Britain and South Korea during economic expansion and downturn. The results demonstrate that, during an economic expansion, the effect of ESOs in increasing employee commitment is stronger in South Korea, while their effect in decreasing employee turnover is stronger in Britain. However, during an economic downturn, the authors find no evidence for these effects in both societies. The findings lend support to the contingency perspective in managing ESOs and provide meaningful implications and guidance to the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Yeongjoon Yoon & Sukanya Sengupta, 2019. "The effect of employee share ownership on employee commitment and turnover: comparing the cases in Britain and South Korea and the role of the economy," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(5-6), pages 486-516, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:indrel:v:50:y:2019:i:5-6:p:486-516
    DOI: 10.1111/irj.12272
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