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Multi-Founding Family Firms: Effects on Firm Governance, Innovation, and Performance

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  • So-Yeon Lim
  • Seung-Hwan Jeong

Abstract

Traditionally, family firm studies have assumed there is a single family behind the firm. We challenge this assumption and argue that the distinction between multi-founding family firms and single-founding family firms matters. We theorize that multi-founding family firms, based on mutual monitoring among families, have corporate governance advantages (less principal–agent and principal–principal problems) in terms of reduced founder CEO entrenchment and a lower probability of descendent leadership. Furthermore, we argue that multi-founding family firms exhibit higher levels of innovation and performance. Based on U.S. firms during 2001 to 2010, we find robust support for our arguments.

Suggested Citation

  • So-Yeon Lim & Seung-Hwan Jeong, 2025. "Multi-Founding Family Firms: Effects on Firm Governance, Innovation, and Performance," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 49(2), pages 375-402, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:entthe:v:49:y:2025:i:2:p:375-402
    DOI: 10.1177/10422587241279945
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