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Borrowed Time: Sovereign Finance, Regime Type, and Leader Survival

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  • Matthew DiGiuseppe
  • Patrick E. Shea

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  • Matthew DiGiuseppe & Patrick E. Shea, 2016. "Borrowed Time: Sovereign Finance, Regime Type, and Leader Survival," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 342-367, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:28:y:2016:i:3:p:342-367
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    3. Stephen Bagwell, 2023. "Repudiation and Repression: The Human Costs of Sovereign Default," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-13, February.
    4. Tobignaré Yabré & Gervasio Semedo, 2021. "Political stability and fiscal consolidation in sub‐Saharan African countries," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 1077-1109, April.
    5. Daniel Hansen, 2023. "The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 356-410, March.
    6. Tunçer, Ali Coşkun & Weller, Leonardo, 2022. "Democracy, autocracy, and sovereign debt: How polity influenced country risk on the peripheries of the global economy, 1870–1913," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

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