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Do We Need a New Bankruptcy Regime?

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  • Nouriel Roubini

    (New York University)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Nouriel Roubini, 2002. "Do We Need a New Bankruptcy Regime?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 321-333.
  • Handle: RePEc:bin:bpeajo:v:33:y:2002:i:2002-1:p:321-333
    as

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    File URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2002/01/2002a_bpea_roubini.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 408-432.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Prestarle al Rey
      by Juan C. Barboza in Colectivo Económico on 2011-09-30 17:00:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kathrin Berensmann & Angélique Herzberg, 2009. "Sovereign Insolvency Procedures – A Comparative Look At Selected Proposals," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 856-881, December.
    2. Michael Hüther & Christoph Paulus & Kathrin Berensmann, 2010. "Zur Diskussion gestellt: Braucht Europa eine Insolvenzordnung für Staaten?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(23), pages 3-15, December.
    3. Federico Sturzenegger & Punan Chuham, 2003. "Default`s in the 1990`s: What have we learned?"," Business School Working Papers seis, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    4. Marcus H. Miller, 2002. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts--Or No Change?," Policy Briefs PB02-03, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    5. Leszek Balcerowicz, 2010. "Sovereign Bankruptcy in the European Union in the Comparative Perspective," Working Paper Series WP10-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    6. Ashley G. Frank, 2004. "The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: Is It The Proposal Or The Proposer That Is Failing To Find Support?Φ," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 72(4), pages 708-729, September.
    7. Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 85-90, May.
    8. Daniels, Kenneth & Ramirez, Gabriel G., 2007. "Debt restructurings, holdouts, and exit consents," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-17, April.
    9. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism," Working Papers hal-01065546, HAL.
    10. Haldane, Andrew G. & Penalver, Adrian & Saporta, Victoria & Shin, Hyun Song, 2005. "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 315-333, March.
    11. Wolfgang Eggert & Maximilian Stephan & Janine Temme & Handirk von Ungern-Sternberg, 2015. "Diversification, Risk Aversion and Expectation in a Holdout Scenario," CESifo Working Paper Series 5527, CESifo.
    12. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
    13. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Mr. Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons From Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World," IMF Working Papers 2003/013, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Jérôme Sgard, 2004. "IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01065546, HAL.
    16. Busch, Berthold & Matthes, Jürgen, 2015. "Ein Staatsinsolvenzverfahren für den Euroraum," IW policy papers 23/2015, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute.
    17. Heinz-Dieter Smeets & Angélique Herzberg, 2010. "Staatliche Insolvenz in einer Währungsunion," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 65(4), pages 379-399, December.
    18. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Nikolai Stähler, 2013. "Recent Developments In Quantitative Models Of Sovereign Default," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 605-633, September.
    20. Federico Sturzenegger, 2002. "Defaults in the 90´s: Factbook and Preliminary Lessons," Business School Working Papers veintidos, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    21. Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 2008. "Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 798-813, September.

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