Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via
The paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating to sovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisis resolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.
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