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The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds

Author

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  • Andy Haldane, Bank of England
  • Mark Kruger, Bank of Canada

    (Bank of Canada)

Abstract

Over the past year and a half, authors Andy Haldane of the Bank of England and Mark Kruger of the Bank of Canada have been developing a framework for the resolution of international financial crises that aligns incentives for all parties in a way that deals with the crisis and preserves the integrity of the international financial system. The framework is built on principles, not rules. It attempts to be clear about the respective roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors. A central element in shaping private sector expectations is knowledge that the official sector will behave predictably. Constraints on lending by the International Monetary Fund are a key step in that direction. They ensure that private sector involvement is a crucial part of crisis resolution, and they help encourage debtors and creditors to seek co-operative solutions to a crisis. Characterized by constraints, clarity, and orderliness, the framework has the potential to reduce the incidence and cost of financial crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Andy Haldane, Bank of England & Mark Kruger, Bank of Canada, 2002. "The Resolution of International Financial Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds," Bank of Canada Review, Bank of Canada, vol. 2001(Winter), pages 3-13.
  • Handle: RePEc:bca:bcarev:v:2001-2002:y:2002:i:winter01-02:p:3-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Prasanna Gai & Ashley Taylor, 2004. "International Financial Rescues and Debtor-Country Moral Hazard," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 391-420, December.
    2. Andrew G Haldane & Gregor Irwin & Victoria Saporta, 2004. "Bail out or work out? theoretical considerations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(494), pages 130-148, March.
    3. Curzio Giannini, 2003. "Towards a sovereign bankruptcy procedure and greater restraint in IMF crisis lending. An interim assessmen," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 56(225), pages 83-112.
    4. Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
    5. John Chant & Alexandra Lai & Mark Illing & Fred Daniel, 2003. "Essays on Financial Stability," Technical Reports 95, Bank of Canada.
    6. Jeanne, Olivier & Ostry, Jonathan D & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Andrew Powell, 2002. "Countries with international payments´ difficulties: what can the IMF do?," Business School Working Papers veintitres, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    8. Benjamin Martin & Adrian Penalver, 2003. "The effect of payments standstills on yields and the maturity structure of international debt," Bank of England working papers 184, Bank of England.
    9. Curzio Giannini, 2003. "Towards a sovereign bankruptcy procedure and greater restraint in IMF crisis lending. An interim assessmen," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 56(225), pages 83-112.
    10. Steven B. Kamin, 2002. "Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets," International Finance Discussion Papers 736, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Hal S. Scott, 2002. "How Would a New Bankruptcy Regime Help?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(1), pages 334-340.
    12. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    13. Yilmaz AKYüZ, 2005. "Reforming The Imf: Back To The Drawing Board," G-24 Discussion Papers 38, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    14. Brooke, Martin & Pienkowski, Alex & Mendes, Rhys & Santor, Eric, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 27: Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 27, Bank of England.
    15. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
    16. Randall S. Kroszner, 2003. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 75-79, May.
    17. Barry Eichengreen, 2003. "Restructuring Sovereign Debt," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 75-98, Fall.
    18. Dungey, M. & Jacobs, J.P.A.M. & Lestano, L., 2010. "The internationalisation of financial crises," Research Report 10002, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    19. Curzio Giannini, 2003. "Verso una procedura fallimentare per il debito sovrano e maggiore disciplina nei finanziamenti del Fondo Monetario Internazionale. Una valutazione di mezza via," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 56(222), pages 161-193.
    20. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Staff Working Papers 07-10, Bank of Canada.
    21. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Working Papers 0636, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    22. Martin Brooke & Rhys R. Mendes & Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, 2013. "Sovereign Default and State-Contingent Debt," Discussion Papers 13-3, Bank of Canada.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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