Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
AbstractUsing nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more likely to enter HIM jobs. The wage premium falls substantially having accounted for employees’ work histories suggesting that existing studies’ estimates are upwardly biased due to positive selection into HIM. Results do not differ significantly when using propensity score matching as opposed to standard regression techniques. The premium rises with the number of HIM practices and differs markedly across different types of HIM practice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28711.
Date of creation: 02 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
wages; high involvement management; high performance work system; incentive pay; training; team working; information sharing; propensity score matching;
Other versions of this item:
- Petri Böckerman & Alex Bryson & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2013. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 176(4), pages 861-885, October.
- Petri Böckerman & Alex Bryson & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2011. "Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 38575, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Alex Bryson & Petri Böckerman & Pekka Ilmakunnas, 2011. "Does High Involvement Management Lead to Higher Pay?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1046, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Dr Alex Bryson, 2011. "Does High Involvement Managment Lead to Higher Pay?," NIESR Discussion Papers 2908, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
- M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-02-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CIS-2011-02-19 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-HRM-2011-02-19 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-02-19 (Labour Economics)
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