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Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

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  • Patrick Bajari
  • Ali Hortacsu

Abstract

This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10076.

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Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Publication status: published as Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions." Journal of Economic Literature XLII (2004): 457-486.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10076

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Cited by:
  1. Cavallo, Alberto & Rigobon, Roberto, 2011. "The Distribution of the Size of Price Changes," Working Papers, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú 2011-011, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
  2. Xiao, Mo, 2010. "Is quality accreditation effective? Evidence from the childcare market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 708-721, November.
  3. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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