IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/expeco/v11y2008i4p344-357.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Elena Katok
  • Anthony Kwasnica

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Katok & Anthony Kwasnica, 2008. "Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(4), pages 344-357, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:4:p:344-357
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9169-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9169-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10683-007-9169-x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 763-770, June.
    2. Stanley Reynolds & John Wooders, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 9-39, January.
    3. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-599, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2017. "Competing with asking prices," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    2. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2014. "Competing with Asking Prices," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-37, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-51, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Kevin Hasker & Robin Sickles, 2010. "eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 3-42, August.
    5. Benjamin Lester & Ludo Visschers & Ronald Wolthoff, 2014. "Competing with Asking Prices (first version)," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 243, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    6. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-51, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Ronald Wolthoff & Lodewijk Visschers & Benjamin Lester, 2012. "Asking Prices and Inspection Goods," 2012 Meeting Papers 792, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Audrey Hu & Steven A Matthews & Liang Zou, 2019. "Low Reserve Prices in Auctions," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(622), pages 2563-2580.
    9. Chakraborty, Indranil & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2001. "Auctions with endogenous entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 195-200, August.
    10. Ernan Haruvy & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James Cox & Eric Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition between auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 431-448, December.
    11. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ginsburgh, Victor & Legros, Patrick & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2010. "On the incidence of commissions in auction markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 639-644, November.
    13. J.M.J. Delnoij & K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2016. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Working Papers 16-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
    14. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    15. Bolton, Gary E. & Ockenfels, Axel, 2014. "Does laboratory trading mirror behavior in real world markets? Fair bargaining and competitive bidding on eBay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 143-154.
    16. Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Flavio Menezes & Matthew J. Ryan, 2006. "Auctions with options to re‐auction," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 17-39, March.
    17. Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2015. "Contests with endogenous entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 387-424, May.
    18. Han, Jidong & Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter T.L. & Zhang, Zelin, 2021. "Empirical Analyses of Nonlinear Effects of Reserve Prices on Ending Prices in Online Auctions," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 86-102.
    19. Jingfeng Lu, 2010. "Entry Coordination And Auction Design With Private Costs Of Information Acquisition," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(2), pages 274-289, April.
    20. Damian Damianov, 2012. "Seller competition by mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 105-137, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Experimental economics; D44; C91;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:11:y:2008:i:4:p:344-357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.