Cultural Leaders and the Clash of Civilizations
AbstractThis article builds a micro founded model of the clash of cultures. The clash is defined as the parents fear of a trait change by their child in an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. The extent of the clash is manipulated by cultural leaders who benefit from the cultural education eort by parents. We identify three channels through which the leaders can affect the clash of cultures: (i) by providing benecial cultural values, (ii) by claims of cultural superiority and (iii) by cultural alienation, i.e. by inducing cultural dislike towards their own group. We show that all three channels can be in the leaders interest but channels (ii) and (iii) reduce the utility of the leaders goup members. This hints to a strong conict of interest within groups - between the population at large and the benefactors of radicalization. We further show how the use of alienation relates to the economic opportunities available to a group.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 481.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
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