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Search, Bargaining, and Employer Discrimination

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Author Info
Asa Rosen (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University)
Abstract

This article analyzes Becker's ([1957] 1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less and apply stricter hiring criteria to these workers. The highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and management are separated, both highest profits and highest utility can be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry or takeovers, do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination disappear.

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JOLE210403
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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 807-830
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:21:y:2003:i:4:p:807-830

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  1. Andrea Weber & Christine Zulehner, 2009. "Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?," NRN working papers 2009-26, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kaas, Leo & Lu, Jun, 2009. "Equal-Treatment Policy in a Random Search Model with Taste Discrimination," IZA Discussion Papers 4173, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  3. Ambra Poggi, 2008. "Job satisfaction, working conditions and job-expectations," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 74, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Vendrik,Maarten C.M. & Schwieren,Christiane, 2005. "Identification, screening and stereotyping in labor market discrimination," Research Memoranda 013, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.

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