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Discrimination and Employment Protection

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Author Info

  • Holden, Steinar

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Rosén, Åsa

    (Stockholm University (SOFI))

Abstract

We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain ex ante, there may exist a discriminatory equilibrium where workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will use longer time to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for the firms to hire the discriminated workers, thus sustaining discrimination. In contrast to standard models, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate also for firms without discriminatory preferences.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2009/Memo-22-2009.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 22/2009.

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Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: 29 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_022

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
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Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Keywords: Discrimination; Employment Protection; Hiring Standards;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Barth, Erling & Bratsberg, Bernt & Raaum, Oddbjørn, 2012. "Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 541-556.

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