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An Equilibrium Search-Matching Model of Discrimination

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  • A Rosen

Abstract

A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0097.

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Date of creation: Sep 1992
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0097

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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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  1. Christopher A. Pissarides & Jonathan Wadsworth, 1990. "Who are the Unemployed?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0012, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  2. George J. Borjas & Stephen G. Bronars, 1988. "Consumer Discrimination and Self-Employment," NBER Working Papers 2627, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Blanchard, O.J. & Diamond, P., 1990. "Ranking, Unemployment Duration, And Wages," Working papers 546, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Kim B. Clark & Lawrence H. Summers, 1982. "The Dynamics of Youth Unemployment," NBER Chapters, in: The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, pages 199-234 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-61, September.
  6. Holzer, Harry J, 1987. "Informal Job Search and Black Youth Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 446-52, June.
  7. Akerlof, George A, 1985. "Discriminatory, Status-based Wages among Tradition-oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 265-76, April.
  8. McCormick, Barry, 1986. "Employment Opportunities, Earnings, and the Journey to Work of Minority Workers in Great Britain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(382), pages 375-97, June.
  9. Coate, Stephen & Loury, Glenn C, 1993. "Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1220-40, December.
  10. Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226041162, August.
  11. Richard Startz & Lundberg, . "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 19-81, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  12. Vroman, S B, 1985. "No-Help-Wanted Signs and the Duration of Job Search," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 767-73, September.
  13. Lang, Kevin, 1986. "A Language Theory of Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 363-82, May.
  14. Milgrom, Paul & Oster, Sharon, 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-76, August.
  15. Bulow, Jeremy I & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986. "A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy,Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 376-414, July.
  16. Jackman, Richard & Layard, Richard, 1991. "Does Long-term Unemployment Reduce a Person's Chance of a Job? A Time-Series Test," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 58(229), pages 93-106, February.
  17. Pissarides, C A, 1984. "Efficient Job Rejection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 97-108, Supplemen.
  18. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "A model of employment outcomes illustrating the effect of the structure of information on the level and distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 231-236.
  19. Blau, Francine D & Ferber, Marianne A, 1987. "Discrimination: Empirical Evidence from the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 316-20, May.
  20. Rees, Albert, 1986. "An Essay on Youth Joblessness," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 613-28, June.
  21. Barron, John M, 1975. "Search in the Labor Market and the Duration of Unemployment: Some Empirical Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 934-42, December.
  22. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-90, September.
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