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Discrimination and Employment Protection

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  • Åsa Rosén

    (stockholm University)

  • Steinar Holden

    (Oslo University)

Abstract

We study a search model with firing cost. We show that there exists an equilibrium with discriminatory hiring standards of worker only differing in an observable characteristic determining their type. Even though the firm can observe the workers' expected productivity at the hiring stage, it still may condition its hiring standard on group belonging, due to feedback effects of other firm' hiring standards. The model predicts higher unemployment rates, stricter hiring standards, longer tenure for discriminated workers and a positive relation between employment protection and relative unemployment rates for discriminated workers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 350.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed009:350

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Cited by:
  1. Erling Barth & Bernt Bratsberg & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2011. "Immigrant Wage Profiles Within and Between Establishments," Norface Discussion Paper Series 2011019, Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London.

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