Trade Secrets and Information Sharing
AbstractIf trade secrets are weakly protected by law, firms risk losing their valuable information when employees are hired by competitors. It may therefore be optimal to limit the number of employees who share the trade secrets even if it reduces the firm's productive efficiency. The benefits of limited information sharing are greatest if the efficiency cost is low and the competition in the market is neither very tough nor very weak. It is shown that it is more profitable to reduce the information sharing by giving the employees different information than by giving some employees more information than others. Copyright (c) 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 10 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Motta, Massimo & Rønde, Thomas, 2002.
"Trade secret laws, labor mobility, and innovations,"
08-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Motta, Massimo & Rønde, Thomas, 2002. "Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility and Innovations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A., 2002.
"Softening Competition by Enhancing entry: An Example from the Banking Industry,"
2002-86, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 782, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry," CSEF Working Papers 85, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Fosfuri, Andrea & Rønde, Thomas, 2002. "High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws," Working Papers 07-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.