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Competition Policy and Regulation

Editor

Listed:
  • Michael Faure
  • Xinzhu Zhang

Abstract

This unique book considers competition policy and regulation in light of the recent introduction of the anti-monopoly law in China. It addresses the relevance of competition policy for China from a broad theoretical and practical perspective, bringing together lawyers and economists from China, Europe and the US to provide an integrated law and economics approach.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), 2011. "Competition Policy and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13912.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:13912
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849800754.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Roger Van den Bergh, 2007. "The Economics of Competition Policy and the Draft of the Chinese," Chapters, in: Thomas Eger & Michael Faure & Zhang Naigen (ed.), Economic Analysis of Law in China, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Thomas Eger & Michael Faure & Zhang Naigen (ed.), 2007. "Economic Analysis of Law in China," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12554.
    6. Jean-Pierre Benoit, 1984. "Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 490-499, Winter.
    7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    8. Garth Saloner, 1987. "Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 165-186, Summer.
    9. Saloner, Garth, 1985. "Excess capacity as a policing device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 83-86.
    10. Roberts, John, 1986. "A Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(0), pages 75-93, Suppl. No.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Book Chapters

    The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Development Studies; Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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