A Simple Theory of Predation
AbstractWe propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it needs, thus making monopoly profits on later buyers. Several extensions are considered, including markets where scale economies exist because of demand externalities or two-sided market effects, and where markets are characterised by common costs. Conditions under which predation may take place in actual cases are also discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7372.
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2012. "A Simple Theory of Predation," Working Papers 437, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2010. "A Simple Theory of Predation," CSEF Working Papers 255, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2010. "A Simple Theory of Predation," Working Papers 2010.15, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2009-11-27 (Law & Economics)
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