Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure
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- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2020. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 763-812.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2019. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure," Working Papers 640, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2018. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1899, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2019. "Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure," CSEF Working Papers 522, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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- Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021.
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- Bruno Jullien & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Post-Print halshs-03476144, HAL.
- Bruno Jullien & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2020. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 8463, CESifo.
- Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2020. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 15071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2020.
"Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
- Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2019. "Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred," CEPR Discussion Papers 14031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2019. "Tying in Evolving Industries, When Future Entry Cannot be Deterred," CSEF Working Papers 548, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2019. "Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred," Working Papers 654, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2019. "Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19123, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Motta, Massimo, 2023. "Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, 2024. "Economic Principles for the Enforcement of Abuse of Dominance Provisions," Working Papers 1431, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Motta, Massimo & Peitz, Martin, 2021.
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- Motta, Massimo & Peitz, Martin, 2020. "Big Tech Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 14353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Massimo Motta & Martin Peitz, 2020. "Big Tech Mergers," Working Papers 1198, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Massimo Motta & Martin Peitz, 2020. "Big tech mergers," Economics Working Papers 1736, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Massimo Motta & Martin Peitz, 2020. "Big Tech Mergers," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_147v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Hunold, Matthias & Schad, Jannika, 2023. "Single monopoly profits, vertical mergers, and downstream foreclosure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
- Massimo Motta & Martin Peitz, 2023. "Denial of Interoperability and Future First-Party Entry," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_447, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
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- Massimo Motta, 2022.
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- Massimo Motta, 2022. "Self-Preferencing and Foreclosure in Digital Markets: Theories of Harm for Abuse Cases," Working Papers 1374, Barcelona School of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Inefficient foreclosure; Refusal to supply; Exclusion; Monopolisation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2018-01-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2018-01-22 (Microeconomics)
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