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Predation Under Perfect Information

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  • Argenton, C.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

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  • Argenton, C., 2010. "Predation Under Perfect Information," Discussion Paper 2010-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:c64644e5-2aae-4e41-9a47-ae13e8ce3556
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    1. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    3. David Scharfstein, 1984. "A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Market Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 229-243, Summer.
    4. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    7. Fiona Scott Morton, 1997. "Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 679-724, December.
    8. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
    9. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    10. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion and predation under (almost) free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 381-401.
    11. Yamey, B S, 1972. "Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 129-142, April.
    12. Roth, David, 1996. "Rationalizable Predatory Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 380-396, February.
    13. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dai Zusai, 2012. "Excess Liquidity against Predation," DETU Working Papers 1201, Department of Economics, Temple University.

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