We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
7303.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991.
"Naked Exclusion,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-45, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Goeree, Jacob & Holt, Charles & Palfrey, Thomas, 2005.
"Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
1219, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2004.
"Regular quantal response equilibrium,"
Working Papers
1203, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Frank Heinemann & Rosemarie Nagel & Peter Ockenfels, 2004.
"Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games,"
Discussion Papers
6, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998.
"Exclusive Dealing,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1996.
"Exclusive Dealing,"
NBER Working Papers
5666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.