Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers
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- Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Thomas Roende, 2009. "Exclusive dealing, entry, and mergers," CSEF Working Papers 225, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Motta, Massimo & Persson, Lars & Fumagalli, Chiara, 2005. "Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Countervailing Power; Exclusion; Buyers’ Fragmentation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2006-01-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-01-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2006-01-24 (Industrial Organization)
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