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Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jan Bouckaert () (University of Antwerp, Department of Economics)
Hans Degryse () (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and CentER for Economic Research)
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We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number
85.
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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:85Contact details of provider: Postal: 84084 Fisciano (SA) Phone: 089 - 96 3167 Fax: 089 - 96 3169 Email: Web page: http://www.csef.it/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: barriers to entry asymmetric information switching costs banking competition Other versions of this item:
Paper Bouckaert, J. & Degryse, H., 2002.
"Softening competition by enhancing entry: : an example from the banking industry ,"
Discussion Paper
86, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse Hans, 2002.
"Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000.
"Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey ,"
CSEF Working Papers
36, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy.
[Downloadable!]
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Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997.
"Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives ,"
Review of Financial Studies ,
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Other versions:
Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1994.
"Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives ,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993.
" Information Sharing in Credit Markets ,"
Journal of Finance ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Sharpe, Steven A, 1990.
" Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Ezra Friedman & Robert Marquez, 1999.
"Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 515-534, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000.
"Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1999.
"Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device ,"
CSEF Working Papers
21, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy.
[Downloadable!] A Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994.
"Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device ,"
CEPR Financial Markets Paper
0043, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG.
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9911, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
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"Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device ,"
Papers
73, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1996.
"Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device ,"
Papers
0073, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992.
" Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bester, Helmut, 1992.
"Bertrand Equilibrium in a Differentiated Duopoly ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 433-48, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2006.
"Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(513), pages 702-720, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Xavier Vives, 2001.
"Competition in the Changing World of Banking ,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 535-547.
Thomas Rønde, 2001.
"Trade Secrets and Information Sharing ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(3), pages 391-417, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nilssen, Tore, 2000.
"Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 641-666, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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