IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sef/csefwp/79.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Bouckaert

    (University of Antwerp, Department of Economics)

  • Hans Degryse

    (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and CentER for Economic Research)

Abstract

The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration. These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers. We show that these deregulations may be insufficient since asymmetric information seriously hampers the integration of credit markets. Moreover, banks may strategically display some information hindering the scale of entry when asymmetric information is moderate. We also show that voluntary information sharing emerges only when asymmetric information is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2002. "Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets," CSEF Working Papers 79, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:79
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp79.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Banking Competition and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Macroeconomic Consequences of the EMU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(4), pages 359-374, December.
    2. Apergis, Nicholas & Fafaliou, Irene & Stefanitsis, Marinos, 2016. "Asymmetric information and employment: evidence from the U.S. banking sector," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 14(PB), pages 199-210.
    3. Carlos Arriaga & Luis Miranda, 2009. "Risk and Efficiency in Credit Concession: A Case Study in Portugal," Managing Global Transitions, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 7(3), pages 307-326.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
    5. Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 2002. "Information sharing, lending and defaults: Cross-country evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(10), pages 2017-2045, October.
    6. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May.
    7. Cacciatore, Matteo & Ghironi, Fabio & Stebunovs, Viktors, 2015. "The domestic and international effects of interstate U.S. banking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 171-187.
    8. Patrick Honohan, 1994. "Integration of Financial Markets in Europe: Implications for the Irish Banking System," Papers WP050, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    9. Jentzsch, Nicola, 2008. "An economic analysis of China's credit information monopoly," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 537-550, December.
    10. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1995. "A welfare comparison of intermediaries and financial markets in Germany and the US," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 179-209, February.
    11. Gual, Jordi, 2003. "Integration of EU banking markets, The," IESE Research Papers D/504, IESE Business School.
    12. Maxwell Sandada & Agness Kanhukamwe, 2016. "The study sought to analyse the factors that lead to rising credit risk in the Zimbabwean banking sector," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 12(1), pages 80-94, February.
    13. Heinemann, Friedrich & Jopp, Mathias, 2002. "The benefits of a working European Retail Market for financial services: Report to European Financial Services Round Table," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 110486.
    14. Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A., 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing entry : An Example from the Banking Industry," Other publications TiSEM 1cf58bbb-25a9-4e6e-a11f-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Gambacorta, Leonardo, 2008. "How do banks set interest rates?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 792-819, July.
    16. Aloisio Araujo & Bruno Funchal, 2015. "How Much Should Debtors be Punished in Case of Default?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 229-245, April.
    17. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Restructuring Financial Regulation in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 57-82, February.
    18. Bernardo Batiz-Lazo & Douglas Wood, 2003. "Corporate strategy for Mexican banks and market contestability," Industrial Organization 0301014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Xuehui He & Yiming Wang, 2007. "Bank Loan Behavior and Credit Information Sharing: An Insight from Measurement Costs," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 325-333.
    20. Mihasonirina Andrianaivo & Charles Amo Yartey, 2009. "Understanding the Growth of African Financial Markets," IMF Working Papers 2009/182, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    financial integration; banking competition; asymmetric information; barriers to entry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dr. Maria Carannante (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cssalit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.