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Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device

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Author Info
Padilla, A.J.
Pagano, M.

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Abstract

Creditors often share information about their customers' credit records. Besides helping them to spot bad risks, this acts as a disciplinary device. If creditors are known to inform one another of defaults, borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders. This increases their incentive to perform. However, sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect: borrowers' incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information. In some instances, by ``fine-tuning'' the type and accuracy of the information shared, lenders can raise borrowers' incentives to their first-best level.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros- in its series Papers with number 9911.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9911

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Postal: Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros. Casado del Alisal, 5-28014 Madrid, Spain.
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Related research
Keywords: CREDIT ; INFORMATION ; INCENTIVES ; BANKS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages

Cited by:
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  1. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey," CSEF Working Papers 36, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stéphane Straub & Horacio Sosa, 1999. "Institutional Arrangements to Ensure Willingness to Repay in Financial Markets: A Case Study of Paraguay," RES Working Papers 3062, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Thomas Gehrig & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1837, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Semenova, Maria, 2006. "Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting," MPRA Paper 359, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Eric Van Tassel, 2009. "Sharing credit information under endogenous costs," Working Papers 09004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence," RES Working Papers 3069, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. José L. Negrin, 2004. "The Importance of Borrowers’ History on Credit Behavior: The Mexican Experience," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 226, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1999. "Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2184, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse Hans, 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Brown, Martin & Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 2007. "Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2007. "Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders," Development Working Papers 232, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Mermelstein, David A., 2006. "Defaults en carteras hipotecarias, macroeconomía y arreglos institucionales: Más allá de los modelos de Credit-Scoring tradicionales
    [Mortgage defaults, macroeconomics, and institutional arrange    ," MPRA Paper 7535, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 1998. "Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 361-392, September. [Downloadable!]
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