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Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device

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Author Info
A. Jorge Padilla () (CEMFI and CEPR)
Marco Pagano () (CSEF, Università di Salerno, and CEPR)

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Abstract

Creditors often share information about their customers' credit record. Besides helping them to spot bad risks, this informational exchange acts as a disciplinary device. If creditors are known to exchange data about defaults, borrowers must consider that default on a current lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders. This raises their incentive to perform. But sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect: when lenders only disclose past defaults, borrowers' incentives to perform may be greater than when lenders share all their information. In some instances, by "fine-tuning" the type and accuracy of the information shared, lenders can raise borrowers' incentives to their first-best level.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 21.

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Date of creation: 01 May 1999
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Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, 2000, vol. 44, pages 1951-80
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:21

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Related research
Keywords: Fiscal policy; national saving; contractionary fiscal expansions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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Cited by:
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  1. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey," CSEF Working Papers 36, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stéphane Straub & Horacio Sosa, 1999. "Institutional Arrangements to Ensure Willingness to Repay in Financial Markets: A Case Study of Paraguay," RES Working Papers 3062, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Thomas Gehrig & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1837, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2008. "Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Semenova, Maria, 2006. "Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting," MPRA Paper 359, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Eric Van Tassel, 2009. "Sharing credit information under endogenous costs," Working Papers 09004, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bennardo, Alberto & Pagano, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2009. "Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence," RES Working Papers 3069, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  10. José L. Negrin, 2004. "The Importance of Borrowers’ History on Credit Behavior: The Mexican Experience," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 226, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1999. "Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2184, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Bouckaert, Jan & Degryse Hans, 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Brown, Martin & Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 2007. "Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6313, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2007. "Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders," Development Working Papers 232, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Mermelstein, David A., 2006. "Defaults en carteras hipotecarias, macroeconomía y arreglos institucionales: Más allá de los modelos de Credit-Scoring tradicionales
    [Mortgage defaults, macroeconomics, and institutional arrange    ," MPRA Paper 7535, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 1998. "Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 361-392, September. [Downloadable!]
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