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Content
2016, Volume 95, Issue C
2015, Volume 94, Issue C
- 1-14 Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
by Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John
- 15-28 Symmetry and impartial lotteries
by Mackenzie, Andrew
- 29-38 Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
by Kalandrakis, Tasos
- 39-56 Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives
by Dutcher, E. Glenn & Balafoutas, Loukas & Lindner, Florian & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Sutter, Matthias
- 57-79 “Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?
by Fu, Qiang & Ke, Changxia & Tan, Fangfang
- 80-96 Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study
by Polonio, Luca & Di Guida, Sibilla & Coricelli, Giorgio
- 97-121 Extremism in revolutionary movements
by Shadmehr, Mehdi
- 122-141 School-track environment or endowment: What determines different other-regarding behavior across peer groups?
by John, Katrin & Thomsen, Stephan L.
- 142-156 Invariance to representation of information
by Yildiz, Muhamet
- 157-168 How to gamble against all odds
by Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron
- 169-181 Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget
by Drexl, Moritz & Kleiner, Andreas
- 182-187 Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment
by Balbus, Lukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Wozny, Lukasz
- 188-190 A global game with strategic substitutes and complements: Comment
by Hoffmann, Eric J. & Sabarwal, Tarun
- 191-199 Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: Experimental evidence
by Parravano, Melanie & Poulsen, Odile
- 200-205 Spatial implementation
by Brady, Richard L. & Chambers, Christopher P.
- 206-213 On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
by Yoon, Kiho
- 214-221 Existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions with private risk aversion and private initial wealth
by Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng
2015, Volume 93, Issue C
- 1-23 Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections
by Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall
- 24-41 Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
by Naroditskiy, Victor & Steinberg, Richard
- 42-58 Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
by Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu
- 59-88 Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
by Graham, Brett & Bernhardt, Dan
- 89-107 Focal points and bargaining in housing markets
by Pope, Devin G. & Pope, Jaren C. & Sydnor, Justin R.
- 108-116 Agreeing to agree and Dutch books
by Chen, Yi-Chun & Lehrer, Ehud & Li, Jiangtao & Samet, Dov & Shmaya, Eran
- 117-127 Legislative bargaining with teams
by Bradfield, Anthony J. & Kagel, John H.
2015, Volume 92, Issue C
- 1-17 Decentralized matching: The role of commitment
by Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Xue, Licun
- 18-27 Making just school assignments
by Morrill, Thayer
- 28-40 Persuasion with communication costs
by Hedlund, Jonas
- 41-52 Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
by Hilbe, Christian & Traulsen, Arne & Sigmund, Karl
- 53-73 Personalized pricing and advertising: An asymmetric equilibrium analysis
by Anderson, Simon & Baik, Alicia & Larson, Nathan
- 74-105 Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
by García-Martínez, José A. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando
- 106-121 Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
by Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Breitmoser, Yves & Bolle, Friedel
- 122-137 Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
by Malcomson, James M.
- 138-149 Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
by Szech, Nora
- 150-165 Indirect control and power in mutual control structures
by Karos, Dominik & Peters, Hans
- 166-190 Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
by You, Jung S.
- 191-205 Bribing in second-price auctions
by Rachmilevitch, Shiran
- 206-227 Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats
by Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion & Abele, Susanne
- 232-247 A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
by Bhaskar, Umang & Fleischer, Lisa & Anshelevich, Elliot
- 248-265 How bad is forming your own opinion?
by Bindel, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Oren, Sigal
- 266-305 Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
by Cai, Yang & Daskalakis, Constantinos
- 306-326 Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
by Cole, Richard & Correa, José R. & Gkatzelis, Vasilis & Mirrokni, Vahab & Olver, Neil
- 327-348 Near-optimal no-regret algorithms for zero-sum games
by Daskalakis, Constantinos & Deckelbaum, Alan & Kim, Anthony
- 349-369 Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert
- 370-400 Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
by Dughmi, Shaddin & Vondrák, Jan
- 401-429 Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
by Hartline, Jason D. & Kleinberg, Robert & Malekian, Azarakhsh
- 430-454 Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
by Papadimitriou, Christos & Pierrakos, George
2015, Volume 91, Issue C
- 1-13 Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks
by Du, Ye & Lehrer, Ehud & Pauzner, Ady
- 14-25 Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
by de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander
- 26-35 Discontinuous games with asymmetric information: An extension of Reny's existence theorem
by He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 36-44 Interim partially correlated rationalizability
by Tang, Qianfeng
- 45-59 Plausible cooperation
by Compte, Olivier & Postlewaite, Andrew
- 60-74 Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
by Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso
- 75-96 Pessimistic information gathering
by Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David
- 97-113 Firing threats: Incentive effects and impression management
by Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Rassenti, Stephen
- 114-144 An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
- 145-165 Strategic disclosure of feasible options
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir
- 166-185 Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring
by Arieli, Itai & Levy, Yehuda John
- 186-206 Blind stealing: Experience and expertise in a mixed-strategy poker experiment
by Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John
- 207-228 Outside opportunities and termination
by Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi
- 229-236 Time and Nash implementation
by Artemov, Georgy
- 237-257 Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
by Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara
- 258-267 Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners
by Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul
- 268-282 The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
by Lahkar, Ratul & Riedel, Frank
- 284-296 Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
by Ashlagi, Itai & Fischer, Felix & Kash, Ian A. & Procaccia, Ariel D.
- 297-317 The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
by Chawla, Shuchi & Malec, David & Sivan, Balasubramanian
- 318-333 Revenue maximization with a single sample
by Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong & Roughgarden, Tim & Yan, Qiqi
- 334-346 Selling privacy at auction
by Ghosh, Arpita & Roth, Aaron
- 347-359 Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games
by Jiang, Albert Xin & Leyton-Brown, Kevin
- 360-382 Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs
by Toulis, Panos & Parkes, David C.
2015, Volume 90, Issue C
- 1-16 Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
by Ortner, Juan
- 17-43 Decentralized matching and social segregation
by Chen, Yan & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Morgan, Peter
- 44-65 A passion for voting
by Panova, Elena
- 66-80 On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence
by Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R.
- 81-92 Posted price selling and online auctions
by Anwar, Sajid & Zheng, Mingli
- 93-105 Learning, hypothesis testing, and rational-expectations equilibrium
by Norman, Thomas W.L.
- 106-118 Optimal compatibility in systems markets
by Kim, Sang-Hyun & Choi, Jay Pil
- 119-127 Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve
- 128-133 Sequential cheap talks
by Kawai, Keiichi
- 134-150 Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gómez-Rúa, María & Molis, Elena
- 151-161 Bargaining with non-convexities
by Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 162-170 Recall and private monitoring
by Phelan, Christopher & Skrzypacz, Andrzej
- 171-180 Ambiguous language and common priors
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien
- 181-206 Learning about challengers
by Câmara, Odilon & Bernhardt, Dan
- 207-214 Committees with leaks
by Ghosh, Saptarshi P. & Roy, Jaideep
- 215-226 Experimental design to persuade
by Kolotilin, Anton
- 227-246 Auctions with online supply
by Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Roth, Aaron
- 247-256 Stochastic bequest games
by Balbus, Łukasz & Jaśkiewicz, Anna & Nowak, Andrzej S.
- 257-273 Ex post information rents in sequential screening
by Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland
2015, Volume 89, Issue C
- 1-16 Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
by Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Lopez-Vargas, Kristian & Ozbay, Erkut Y.
- 17-33 Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.
- 34-42 Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir
- 43-55 An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time
by Pan, Jinrui & Webb, Craig S. & Zank, Horst
- 56-77 The division problem under constraints
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro
- 78-92 The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
- 93-100 X-games
by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran
- 101-121 Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss
by Hashimoto, Kazuhiko & Saitoh, Hiroki
- 122-125 Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
2014, Volume 88, Issue C
- 1-15 Unpredictability of complex (pure) strategies
by Hu, Tai-Wei
- 16-28 Justifiable punishments in repeated games
by Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan
- 29-46 Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
by Mu'alem, Ahuva
- 47-70 Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
by Casella, Alessandra & Turban, Sébastien
- 71-89 Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality
by Bavly, Gilad & Neyman, Abraham
- 90-111 Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
by Sawa, Ryoji
- 112-129 Card games and economic behavior
by Becchetti, Leonardo & Fiaschetti, Maurizio & Marini, Giancarlo
- 130-134 All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
by Minchuk, Yizhaq & Sela, Aner
- 135-152 A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems
by Pálvölgyi, Dénes & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries
- 153-173 A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
by Peck, James
- 174-189 Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
by Ambrus, Attila & Lu, Shih En
- 190-206 Attributes
by Klabjan, Diego & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wolinsky, Asher
- 207-210 Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable
by Rehbeck, John
- 221-241 A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
by Bonanno, Giacomo
- 242-249 Priority matchings revisited
by Okumura, Yasunori
- 260-276 “Bucket auctions” for charity
by Carpenter, Jeffrey & Holmes, Jessica & Matthews, Peter Hans
- 277-285 Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem
by Holzman, Ron & Samet, Dov
- 286-297 Deviations, uncertainty and the core
by Routledge, R.R.
- 298-309 Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
by Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. & Huck, Steffen & Weizsäcker, Georg
- 310-319 Network games under strategic complementarities
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Bramoullé, Yann & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 320-338 Optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation
by Amir, Rabah & Encaoua, David & Lefouili, Yassine
- 339-353 Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
by Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne
- 354-380 Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty
by Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Levendorskiĭ, Sergei
2014, Volume 87, Issue C
- 1-18 Dynamic beliefs
by Macera, Rosario
- 19-33 Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
by Vasconcelos, Luís
- 34-49 Ethics, welfare, and capital markets
by Kanatas, George & Stefanadis, Christodoulos
- 50-69 Staying ahead and getting even: Risk attitudes of experienced poker players
by Eil, David & Lien, Jaimie W.
- 70-90 Variable temptations and black mark reputations
by Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali
- 91-99 A foundation for strategic agenda voting
by Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan
- 100-121 Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study
by Cabral, Luis & Ozbay, Erkut Y. & Schotter, Andrew
- 122-135 Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
by Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Koch, Alexander K. & Normann, Hans-Theo
- 136-160 Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
by Laclau, M.
- 161-177 Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
by Sákovics, József
- 178-203 A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
by Ioannou, Christos A. & Romero, Julian
- 204-223 Learning with bounded memory in games
by Monte, Daniel
- 224-238 Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
by Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Turocy, Theodore L.
- 239-252 Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
by Karos, Dominik
- 253-268 Conditional belief types
by Di Tillio, Alfredo & Halpern, Joseph Y. & Samet, Dov
- 269-287 On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
by Bando, Keisuke
- 288-304 Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias
by Riella, Gil & Teper, Roee
- 305-321 On fair division of a homogeneous good
by Feige, Uriel & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 322-338 Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
by Charness, Gary & Cobo-Reyes, Ramón & Jiménez, Natalia
- 339-352 Sharing the cost of redundant items
by Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moulin, Hervé
- 353-366 Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
by Ellingsen, Tore & Miettinen, Topi
- 367-380 An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
by Hugh-Jones, David & Kurino, Morimitsu & Vanberg, Christoph
- 381-396 Learning in society
by Camargo, Braz
- 397-411 Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
by Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Weidenholzer, Simon
- 412-418 The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
by Maestri, Lucas
- 419-441 Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages
by Miura, Shintaro
- 442-466 From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests
by Gelder, Alan
- 467-484 Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study
by Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg
- 485-496 Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
by Aoyagi, Masaki
- 497-507 Drugs, guns, and targeted competition
by Dubovik, Andrei & Parakhonyak, Alexei
- 508-518 A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
by Adachi, Tsuyoshi
- 519-538 Congested observational learning
by Eyster, Erik & Galeotti, Andrea & Kartik, Navin & Rabin, Matthew
- 539-553 Assigning agents to a line
by Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter
- 554-570 Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings
by Lafky, Jonathan
- 571-590 Judgment aggregation in search for the truth
by Bozbay, İrem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans
- 591-615 Optimal truncation in matching markets
by Coles, Peter & Shorrer, Ran
- 619-623 Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 624-630 Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
by Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo
- 631-641 Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
by Garrett, Daniel F.
- 642-650 Asking questions
by Kos, Nenad
2014, Volume 86, Issue C
- 1-11 Wealth effects and agency costs
by Chade, Hector & Vera de Serio, Virginia N.
- 12-25 Incentives and group identity
by Masella, Paolo & Meier, Stephan & Zahn, Philipp
- 26-39 Impossibility results for parametrized notions of efficiency and strategy-proofness in exchange economies
by Cho, Wonki Jo
- 40-57 On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict
by Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans
- 58-66 A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
by Aiba, Katsuhiko
- 67-76 Universality of Nash components
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Vermeulen, Dries
- 77-95 Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment
by Linde, Jona & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan
- 96-101 Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
by Adachi, Tsuyoshi
- 102-125 On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k
by Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W. & Zizzo, Daniel John
- 126-144 Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
by Tsakas, Elias
- 145-164 Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
by Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Porteiro, Nicolás
- 165-177 A competitive partnership formation process
by Andersson, Tommy & Gudmundsson, Jens & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu
- 178-183 On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols
by Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- 184-211 The crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk sharing: An experimental study
by Lin, Wanchuan & Liu, Yiming & Meng, Juanjuan
- 212-236 Random dictatorship domains
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia
- 237-247 Impulse balance in the newsvendor game
by Ockenfels, Axel & Selten, Reinhard
- 248-263 Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions
by Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.
- 264-281 The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study
by Brindisi, Francesco & Çelen, Boğaçhan & Hyndman, Kyle
- 282-307 Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
by Lima, Rafael Costa & Moreira, Humberto
- 308-329 Level-k reasoning in a generalized beauty contest
by Shapiro, Dmitry & Shi, Xianwen & Zillante, Artie
- 330-338 The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
by Seel, Christian
- 340-366 Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
by Archer, Aaron & Kleinberg, Robert
- 367-391 Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis
by Chen, Ning & Ghosh, Arpita & Lambert, Nicolas S.
- 392-404 Destroy to save
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Naroditskiy, Victor & Polukarov, Maria & Greenwald, Amy & Jennings, Nicholas R.
- 405-420 Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties
by de Weerdt, Mathijs M. & Harrenstein, Paul & Conitzer, Vincent
- 421-437 Bayes–Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction
by Gomes, Renato & Sweeney, Kane
- 438-457 Fault tolerance in large games
by Gradwohl, Ronen & Reingold, Omer
- 458-474 Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums
by Jain, Shaili & Chen, Yiling & Parkes, David C.
- 475-490 Pricing traffic in a spanning network
by Moulin, Hervé
- 491-509 Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
by Penna, Paolo & Ventre, Carmine
2014, Volume 85, Issue C