Decentralization and Collusion

Citations

Cited by:

1. Moriya, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利, 2007. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," Working Paper Series 061, Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University.
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   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," Post-Print hal-00813153, HAL.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00813153, HAL.
   • Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00813153, HAL.
4. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 27/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 253-279.
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   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper 112839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022. "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 17109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
10. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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12. Eyal Winter, 2009. "Incentive Reversal," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 133-147, August.
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13. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021. "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 238-266, January.
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20. Rafael Hortala‐Vallve & Miguel Sanchez Villalba, 2010. "Internalizing Team Production Externalities through Delegation: The British Passenger Rail Sector as an Example," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(308), pages 785-792, October.
21. Kouroche Vafaï, 2004. "Delegation and Opportunism," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 498-521, September.
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23. Ashok S. Rai & Tomas Sjostrom, "undated". "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?," CID Working Papers 40, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
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24. Choe, Chongwoo & Ishiguro, Shingo, 2008. "On the (Sub)optimality of Multi-tier Hierarchies: Coordination versus Motivation," MPRA Paper 13451, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2009. "On The (Sub) Optimality Of Multi-Tier Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Motivation," Monash Economics Working Papers 18/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
25. Madhav V. Rajan & Stefan Reichelstein, 2004. "ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE: A Perspective on ÜAsymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource AllocationÝ," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(12), pages 1615-1623, December.
26. Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "Hierarchies Versus Committees: Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 62-88, March.
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27. Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Miguel Sanchez, 2005. "Hierarchic contracting," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 73, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
28. Andreas Roider, 2006. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)Complete Contract," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 391-411, September.
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    • Roider, Andreas, 2004. "Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract," IZA Discussion Papers 1298, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
29. Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 196-232, December.
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30. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
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31. Choe Chongwoo & Park In-Uck, 2011. "Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, February.
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33. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
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