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Subjective Games and Equilibria: I+

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1999. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 1-40, January.
  2. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
  3. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control," Game Theory and Information 0110003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Krahmer, Daniel, 2007. "Equilibrium learning in simple contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 105-131, April.
  5. Cripps, Martin W. & Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2007. "Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 287-316, May.
  6. Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute.
  7. Oechssler, Jorg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2003. "Can you guess the game you are playing?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 137-152, April.
  8. Feinberg, Yossi, 2005. "Subjective reasoning--solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 94-132, July.
  9. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," GE, Growth, Math methods 9507001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  11. Ying Tang & Andrea Moro & Sandro Sozzo & Zhiyong Li, 2018. "Modelling trust evolution within small business lending relationships," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, December.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:11:p:1-12 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Masahiko Aoki, 2006. "Mechanisms of Endogenous Institutional Change," Discussion Papers 05-013, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  14. Levy, Yehuda John, 2015. "Limits to rational learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 1-23.
  15. Rode, Julian, 2008. "Truth and trust in communication : experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Papers 08-04, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  16. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
  17. Rodolphe Durand & Robert M. Grant & Tammy L. Madsen & Joshua Gans & Michael D. Ryall, 2017. "Value capture theory: A strategic management review," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 17-41, January.
  18. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Thomas Sargent, 2016. "A Framework for the Analysis of Self-Confirming Policies," Working Papers 573, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  19. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2016. "Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 243(1), pages 147-177, August.
  20. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
  21. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 1-29.
  22. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2002. "Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-306, November.
  23. Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  24. Hong, Lu & Page, Scott E., 2001. "Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 123-163, March.
  25. Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone & Maccheroni, Fabio & Schmeidler, David, 2022. "Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 110-131.
  26. Marco Scarsini & Yossi Feinberg, 2003. "Rate of Arbitrage and Reconciled Beliefs," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-12.
  27. Battigalli, P. & Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M., 2016. "Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-51.
  28. Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  29. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental 9905001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2001. "Learning under minimal information: An experiment on mutual fate control," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 523-557, August.
  31. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2017. "Redefinition of Belief Distorted Nash Equilibria for the Environment of Dynamic Games with Probabilistic Beliefs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 984-1007, March.
  32. Knez, Marc & Simester, Duncan, 2001. "Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 743-772, October.
  33. Schinkel, Maarten Pieter & Tuinstra, Jan & Vermeulen, Dries, 2002. "Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 483-508, December.
  34. Frank Riedel & Linda Sass, 2014. "Ellsberg games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(4), pages 469-509, April.
  35. Rode, Julian, 2010. "Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 325-338, January.
  36. Kalai, Ehud & Shmaya, Eran, 2018. "Large strategic dynamic interactions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 59-81.
  37. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2011. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty," Working Papers 428, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  38. Alexander Smajgl, 2007. "Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 5(2), pages 56-80.
  39. Battigalli, P. & Francetich, A. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Learning and self-confirming long-run biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 740-785.
  40. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics.
  41. Oishi Hidetsugu, 2003. "Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 168-191, March.
  42. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 1999. "Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 294-309, August.
  43. Battigalli, P. & Francetich, A. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Learning and self-confirming long-run biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 740-785.
  44. Manxi Wu & Saurabh Amin & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2021. "Multi-agent Bayesian Learning with Best Response Dynamics: Convergence and Stability," Papers 2109.00719, arXiv.org.
  45. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
  46. Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Subjective Rationality, Self--Confirming Equilibrium, and Corporate Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(7), pages 936-949, July.
  47. Fabrizio Ferraro & Jeffrey Pfeffer & Robert I. Sutton, 2009. "How and Why Theories Matter: A Comment on Felin and Foss (2009)," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 669-675, June.
  48. Sobel, Joel, 2000. "Economists' Models of Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 241-261, October.
  49. E. Friedman & S. Shenker, 2010. "Synchronous and Asynchronous Learning by Responsive Learning Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 469, David K. Levine.
  50. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  51. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May.
  52. Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 321-344.
  53. Friedman, James W. & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2001. "Learning in Games by Random Sampling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 55-84, May.
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