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Rational Disagreement

Author

Listed:
  • Nabil I. Al-Najjar

    (Northwestern University)

  • Harald Uhlig

    (University of Chicago - Department of Economics)

Abstract

We propose rational disagreement as a formal framework for analyzing seemingly irrational behavior that can persist despite the wide availability of objective information in a steady-state. Agents are rational in that they correctly anticipate the distribution of aggregate outcomes, yet disagree about which specific individuals perform better than others. Notably, the subjective belief of any individual may be objectively correct. We illustrate the key concepts with a simple entry game. We show how unordered individual outcome distributions can be identified solely from aggregate statistics. We then characterize the resulting game, define its Nash equilibria, and develop a statistical test for the null hypothesis of agreement. Finally, we situate our framework within the broader literature on Bayesian games, behavioral biases, and the rational expectations hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Harald Uhlig, 2026. "Rational Disagreement," Working Papers 2026-15, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2026-15
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean‐Pierre Benoît & Juan Dubra, 2011. "Apparent Overconfidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(5), pages 1591-1625, September.
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    3. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-1445, November.
    4. Harald Uhlig, 2012. "Agents as Empirical Macroeconomists: Thomas J. Sargent’s Contribution to Economics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(4), pages 1055-1081, December.
    5. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
    6. Dominic D. P. Johnson & James H. Fowler, 2011. "The evolution of overconfidence," Nature, Nature, vol. 477(7364), pages 317-320, September.
    7. Itzhak Ben-David & John R. Graham, 2013. "Managerial Miscalibration," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(4), pages 1547-1584.
    8. Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
    9. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 3, pages 43-57, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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