Report NEP-MIC-2026-02-09

This is the archive for NEP-MIC, a report on new working papers in the area of Microeconomics. Jing-Yuan Chiou issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-MIC

The following items were announced in this report:

• Martimort, David & Simons (Semenov), Aggey, 2026, "One-Sided Enforcement in a Model with Persistent Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 26-1704, Jan.
• Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2026, "Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.17267, Jan.
• Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2026, "A Demand-Side Driven Explanation of Niche Lobbying: A Theory and Some Application to Climate-Biodiversity Policy," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 26-1706, Jan.
• Jürgen Eichberger & Illia Pasichnichenko, 2025, "Value of Partial Information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School, number 0825.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2026, "Optimal Use of Preferences in Artificial Intelligence Algorithms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.18732, Jan.
• Nicholas H. Kirk, 2026, "Irreversible Failure Reverses the Value of Information," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.12046, Jan.
• Guillouet, Louise & Martimort, David, 2026, "Institutional Design For Environmental Acts," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 26-1705, Jan.
• Tan Gan & Yingkai Li, 2026, "Screening for Choice Sets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.15580, Jan.
• Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2026, "Obviously Strategy-Proof Multi-Dimensional Allocation and the Value of Choice," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.20035, Jan.
• Zhuo Chen & Yun Liu, 2026, "Accelerator and Brake: Dynamic Persuasion with Dead Ends," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.13686, Jan.
• Zihao Li & Xuandong Chen, 2026, "Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers: A Queueing Theory Approach," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.20728, Jan, revised Feb 2026.
• Giovanni Valvassori Bolg`e, 2026, "Extreme Points and Large Contests," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.19331, Jan.
• Yaonan Jin & Yingkai Li, 2026, "Anonymous Pricing in Large Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.16488, Jan.
• Esmat Sangari & Rajni Kant Bansal, 2026, "Bundling and Price-Matching in Competitive Complementary Goods Markets," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.15350, Jan.
• Masaki Miyashita, 2026, "Characteristics Design: A Hedonic Approach to Optimal Product Differentiation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.21573, Jan, revised Feb 2026.
• Mark Whitmeyer, 2026, "Distributional Competition," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.22112, Jan, revised Feb 2026.
• Shipra Agrawal & Yiding Feng & Wei Tang, 2026, "Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2602.01066, Feb.
• Federico Echenique & Mat'ias N'u~nez, 2026, "Compromise by "multimatum"," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.21275, Jan, revised Feb 2026.
• Sander Onderstal & Ruben van Oosten, 2025, "Vertical Integration in Auction Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 25-046/VII, Aug.
• Alex Frankel & Navin Kartik, 2026, "How Wasteful is Signaling?," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.14454, Jan.
• Kailin Chen, 2026, "Quasi-Concavity, Convexity of Optimal Actions, and the Local Single-Crossing Property," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.12783, Jan.
• Jan Zápal & Clara Ponsatí, 2026, "Electing the Pope: Elections by Repeated Ballots," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1553, Jan.
• Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Harald Uhlig, 2026, "Rational Disagreement," Working Papers, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics, number 2026-15.
• Brian C. Albrecht & Mark Whitmeyer, 2026, "Pass-through with Price Dispersion," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2601.17964, Jan.