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Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice

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Cited by:

  1. Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016. "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 699-727.
  2. Andrés Perea & Elias Tsakas, 2019. "Limited focus in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 571-607, June.
  3. Filipe Costa Souza & Leandro Chaves Rêgo, 2014. "Mixed Equilibrium, Collaborative Dominance and Burning Money: An Experimental Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 377-400, May.
  4. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "On Forward Induction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, January.
  5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January.
  6. Thomas de Haan & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2015. "Money Talks? An Experimental Investigation Of Cheap Talk And Burned Money," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(4), pages 1385-1426, November.
  7. Gregory Phelan, 2017. "Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1253-1284, June.
  8. Evdokimov, Piotr & Rustichini, Aldo, 2016. "Forward induction: Thinking and behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 195-208.
  9. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596, Elsevier.
  10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1999. "Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 155-170, July.
  11. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  12. Blume, Andreas & Gneezy, Uri, 2010. "Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 488-511, March.
  13. Gary Charness & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez & Matthias Sutter, 2023. "An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1530-1543, November.
  14. Dale, Donald J. & Morgan, John & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2002. "Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 52-88, January.
  15. Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
  16. Andersson, Ola & Holm, Håkan J., 2010. "Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games: An explorative experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 477-495, September.
  17. David Sally, 2002. "`What an Ugly Baby!'," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(1), pages 78-108, February.
  18. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  19. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
  21. Antić, Nemanja & Persico, Nicola, 2023. "Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 299-310.
  22. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2005. "Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 109-127, April.
  23. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
  24. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
  25. Kopányi-Peuker, Anita & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph, 2017. "Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 273-290.
  26. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  27. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Cabrales, Antonio, 2023. "Pricing group membership," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 114-121.
  28. Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Network architecture, salience and coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 76-90, September.
  29. Karl WÄrneryd, 1998. "Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 599-609.
  30. Shimoji, Makoto, 2004. "On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 385-402, August.
  31. Fehr, Dietmar, 2018. "Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 123-134.
  32. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  33. Andreas Blume, 2011. "The Dog That Did Not Bark: Pre-Play Communication with Foregone Costly Messages," Working Paper 438, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2011.
  34. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
  35. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  36. Andrea Martinangeli & Peter Martinsson & Amrish Patel, 2017. "Coordination via redistribution," University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series 2017-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  37. Giordani, Paolo E. & Ruta, Michele, 2013. "Coordination failures in immigration policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 55-67.
  38. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt68d1t1xg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  39. Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
  40. Govindan, Srihari & Robson, Arthur J., 1998. "Forward Induction, Public Randomization, and Admissibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 451-457, October.
  41. Elias Tsakas & Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Resisting persuasion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 723-742, October.
  42. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Delegation Using Forward Induction," Working Papers 1026, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
  43. Matthews, Steven A, 1995. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 567-589, May.
  44. Cabrales, Antonio & Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Wantchekon, Léonard, 2006. "Liberal democracy as the result of an "aborted" communist revolution," UC3M Working papers. Economics we072212, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  45. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2018. "Inefficient stage Nash is not stable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 275-293.
  46. Marcoux, Mathieu, 2022. "Strategic interactions in mobile network investment with a new entrant and unobserved heterogeneity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
  47. Rohit Patel & Can Urgun, 2021. "Costly Inspection and Money Burning in Internal Capital Markets," Working Papers 2021-29, Princeton University. Economics Department..
  48. Michal Krol & Magdalena Ewa Krol, 2020. "On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 23-45, March.
  49. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  50. Gintis, Herbert, 2009. "The local best response criterion: An epistemic approach to equilibrium refinement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 89-97, August.
  51. Richter, Michael, 2014. "Fully absorbing dynamic compromise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 92-104.
  52. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2017. "Voluntary Assurance of Voluntary CSR Disclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 205-230, February.
  53. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
  54. Bo Chen & Rajat Deb, 2018. "The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 381-414, October.
  55. Tigran Melkonyan & Surajeet Chakravarty, 2024. "Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 308-328, January.
  56. Seel, Christian & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 111-113.
  57. Asst. Prof. Yong-Gwan Kim, 1994. "An Evolutionary Approach to Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments," Game Theory and Information 9403006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  58. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Capacity," Discussion Papers 1131, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  59. Andreas Blume & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study," Working Paper 346, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised May 2009.
  60. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 375-402, February.
  61. Ilkka Leppänen, 2020. "Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 783-799, April.
  62. Cooper, David J. & Ioannou, Christos A. & Qi, Shi, 2018. "Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 78-97.
  63. Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019. "Delegation Using Forward Induction," Working Papers 17, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
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