Coordination via redistribution
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Bacharach, Michael, 1999. "Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 117-147, June.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Uri Gneezy & Yuval Rottenstreich, 2008. "The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1443-1458, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2017.
"Reciprocity networks and the participation problem,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 260-272.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Patel, Amrish, 2014. "Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem," Working Papers in Economics 603, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Amrish Patel, 2014. "Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 4890, CESifo Group Munich.
- Martin Dufwenberg & Amrish Patel, 2014. "Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem," Working Papers 521, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Charness, Gary & Frechette, Guillaume R. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2007.
"Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 287-306, August.
- Charness, Gary B & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2005. "Endogenous Transfers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Experimental Test Of Cooperation And Coordination," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt9cm846c4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004.
"A theory of sequential reciprocity,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
- Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper 1998-37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5899, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, David K. Levine.
- López-Pérez, Raúl & Pintér, Ágnes & Kiss, Hubert J., 2015.
"Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? A test of Schelling's conjecture,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 209-222.
- Raul Lopez-Perez & Agnes Pinter & Hubert Janos Kiss, 2013. "Does Payoff Equity Facilitate Coordination? A test of Schelling's Conjecture," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1346, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Bett, Zoë & Poulsen, Anders & Poulsen, Odile, 2016. "The focality of dominated compromises in tacit coordination situations: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 29-34.
- Andrea Isoni & Anders Poulsen & Robert Sugden & Kei Tsutsui, 2014. "Efficiency, Equality, and Labeling: An Experimental Investigation of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3256-3287, October.
More about this item
Keywordscoordination; redistribution; experiment; distributive preferences; forward induction; signalling altruism;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2018-01-01 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2018-01-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2018-01-01 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2017_07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Cushan). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/esueauk.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.