How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective
This paper proposes an extension of the valuation equilibrium concept (Jehiel and Samet, 2007), which partly endogenises the underlying grouping of actions. The effect on equilibrium predictions is illustrated in a burning money game.
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- Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2005.
"Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 109-127, April.
- Huck, S. & Müller, W., 2005. "Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages : An experimental study on forward induction," Other publications TiSEM 572509ab-51a9-4b52-837d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
- van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
- van Damme, E.E.C., 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Other publications TiSEM bd598a8f-f017-4cab-a9ed-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Samet, Dov, 2007. "Valuation equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(2), June.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2003. "Valuation Equilibria," Game Theory and Information 0310003, EconWPA.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2007. "Valuation Equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00754229, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2006. "Valuation Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000111, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet, 2003. "Valuation Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 709-713.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 1997. "Finite automata play the repeated prisioners dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1639, David K. Levine.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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