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Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. William Minozzi & Jonathan Woon, 2013. "Lying aversion, lobbying, and context in a strategic communication experiment," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(3), pages 309-337, July.
  2. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Experimental 0503005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. John Duffy & Ernest K. Lai & Wooyoung Lim, 2017. "Coordination via correlation: an experimental study," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 265-304, August.
  4. Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2006. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  6. Rode, Julian, 2010. "Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 325-338, January.
  7. Holm, Håkan J., 2010. "Truth and lie detection in bluffing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 318-324, November.
  8. Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute.
  9. Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2020. "Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 368-381.
  10. Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2010. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 984-1007, June.
  11. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  12. Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2017. "Deception and reception: The behavior of information providers and users," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 445-456.
  13. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, "undated". "Welfare in Experimental News Markets," FEEM Working Papers 329585, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
  14. Blume, Andreas & Gneezy, Uri, 2010. "Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 488-511, March.
  15. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
  16. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
  17. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  18. Fries, Tilman & Gneezy, Uri & Kajackaite, Agne & Parra, Daniel, 2021. "Observability and lying," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 132-149.
  19. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2006. "Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634, Stockholm School of Economics.
  20. Ayelet Gneezy & Alex Imas & Amber Brown & Leif D. Nelson & Michael I. Norton, 2012. "Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 179-187, January.
  21. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2023. "Mediated talk: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  22. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, 2024. "Welfare and competition in expert advice markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 74-103.
  23. Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel & Dai, Anovia Yifan, 2016. "Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-66.
  24. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259]," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 453-453, May.
  25. Antonio Cabrales & Michalis Drouvelis & Zeynep Gurguy & Indrajit Ray, 2017. "Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 6781, CESifo.
  26. Andreas Blume & John Duffy & April Mitchell Franco, 2008. "Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation," Working Paper 382, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised May 2009.
  27. Sander Onderstal & Yang Yang, 2020. "Cheap-talk Communication in Procurement Auctions: Theory and Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-013/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  28. Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Communication and social preferences: an experimental analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 15711, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Piotr Evdokimov & Umberto Garfagnini, 2018. "Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 27-49, March.
  30. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ter Meer, Janna, 2013. "Fooling the Nice Guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 321-327.
  31. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt53w1f0w4, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  32. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  33. repec:osf:socarx:5j2w8_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Li, Xiaolin & Özer, Özalp & Subramanian, Upender, 2022. "Are we strategically naïve or guided by trust and trustworthiness in cheap-talk communication?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107103, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  35. Blume, Andreas & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2019. "Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 356-380.
  36. Hertel, Jo & Smith, John, 2009. "Not so cheap talk: a model of advice with communication costs," MPRA Paper 17056, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  37. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
  38. Lightle, John P., 2013. "Harmful lie aversion and lie discovery in noisy expert advice games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 347-362.
  39. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2012. "Authority and communication in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 541-560.
  40. Xiaolin Li & Özalp Özer & Upender Subramanian, 2022. "Are We Strategically Naïve or Guided by Trust and Trustworthiness in Cheap-Talk Communication?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 376-398, January.
  41. Hu, Youxin & Kagel, John & Yang, Huanxing & Zhang, Lan, 2020. "The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 403-415.
  42. Yang, Huanxing & Ye, Zexin & Zhang, Lan, 2025. "Teams versus individuals in pre-play cheap talk communication," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
  43. Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2016. "Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers ECO2016/07, European University Institute.
  44. Blume, Andreas & Noussair, Charles N. & Ye, Bohan, 2024. "Fragile meaning - an experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
  45. Serra-Garcia, Marta & van Damme, Eric & Potters, Jan, 2011. "Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 244-261, September.
  46. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  47. Holm, Håkan J. & Kawagoe, Toshiji, 2010. "Face-to-face lying - An experimental study in Sweden and Japan," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 310-321, June.
  48. Behnk, Sascha & Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván & García-Gallego, Aurora, 2014. "The role of ex post transparency in information transmission—An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 45-64.
  49. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
  50. repec:cgr:cgsser:06-02 is not listed on IDEAS
  51. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2020. "Direct response and the strategy method in an experimental cheap talk game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  52. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
  53. Sean Duffy & Tyson Hartwig & John Smith, 2014. "Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 395-417, March.
  54. Lee, Yong-Ju & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhao, Chen, 2023. "Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 254-280.
  55. Andreas Blume & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study," Working Paper 346, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised May 2009.
  56. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
  57. Lafky, Jonathan & Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung, 2022. "Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 92-116.
  58. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The pros and cons of workplace tournaments," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
  59. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Sonnemans, Joep, 2016. "Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-141.
  60. Agranov, Marina & Schotter, Andrew, 2013. "Language and government coordination: An experimental study of communication in the announcement game," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 26-39.
  61. Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013. "Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
  62. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2019. "Biased recommendations from biased and unbiased experts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 520-540, June.
  63. Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2025. "Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 154, pages 267-284.
  64. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  65. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2015. "Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-12.
  66. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2016. "Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 97-114.
  67. Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022. "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 325-340.
  68. Meng, Delong & Wang, Siyu, 2025. "Echo chambers: Choosing interlocutors and messages," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
  69. Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017. "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 147-161.
  70. Victor Vikram Odouard & Michael Holton Price, 2022. "Tit for Tattling: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other," Papers 2201.06792, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
  71. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
  72. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  73. Cai, Hongbin & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2006. "Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 7-36, July.
  74. Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2019. "The limited value of a second opinion: Competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 144-162.
  75. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
  76. Cabrales, Antonio & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gurguc, Zeynep & Ray, Indrajit, 2018. "Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2018/23, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  77. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2021. "An experiment on deception, reputation and trust," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 821-853, September.
  78. Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 321-344.
  79. Crawford, Vincent P., 2017. "Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 20-31.
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