Face-to-Face Lying – an experimental study in Sweden and Japan
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Other versions of this item:
- Holm, Håkan J. & Kawagoe, Toshiji, 2010. "Face-to-face lying - An experimental study in Sweden and Japan," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 310-321, June.
References listed on IDEAS
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Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 310-321, June.
- Holm, Håkan J. & Kawagoe, Toshiji, 2008. "Face-to-Face Lying – an experimental study in Sweden and Japan," Working Papers 2008:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Muñoz-Izquierdo, Nora & Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz & Rin-Sánchez, Francisco Daniel & Pascual-Ezama, David, 2014. "Economists: cheaters with altruistic instincts," MPRA Paper 60678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Konrad, Kai A. & Lohse, Tim & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception choice and self-selection – The importance of being earnest," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 25-39.
- Alm, James & Bruner, David M. & McKee, Michael, 2016.
"Honesty or dishonesty of taxpayer communications in an enforcement regime,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 85-96.
- James Alm & David M. Bruner & Michael McKee, 2016. "Honesty or Dishonesty of Taxpayer Communications in an Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 1620, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- repec:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:3:p:821-850 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hermann, Daniel & Ostermaier, Andreas, 2018. "Be close to me and I will be honest: How social distance influences honesty," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 340, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Sanjit Dhami, 2017. "Human Ethics and Virtues: Rethinking the Homo-Economicus Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6836, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lohse, Tim & Dwenger, Nadja, 2016.
"Do Individuals Put Effort into Lying? Evidence From a Compliance Experiment,"
Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change
145616, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nadja Dwenger & Tim Lohse, 2016. "Do Individuals Put Effort into Lying? Evidence from a Compliance Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 5805, CESifo Group Munich.
- Rosenbaum, Stephen Mark & Billinger, Stephan & Stieglitz, Nils, 2014. "Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 181-196.
- Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
- Holm, Håkan J. & Kawagoe, Toshiji, 2010.
"Face-to-face lying - An experimental study in Sweden and Japan,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 310-321, June.
- Holm, Håkan J. & Kawagoe, Toshiji, 2008. "Face-to-Face Lying – an experimental study in Sweden and Japan," Working Papers 2008:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- López-Pérez, Raúl & Spiegelman, Eli, 2012. "Do Economists Lie More?," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2012/04, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Kai A. Konrad & Tim Lohse & Salmai Qari, 2017.
"Compliance with Endogenous Audit Probabilities,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(3), pages 821-850, July.
- Kai A. Konrad & Tim Lohse & Salmai Qari, 2015. "Compliance with Endogenous Audit Probabilities," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1493, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Lohse, Tim & Konrad, Kai A. & Qari, Salmai, 2014. "Deception Choice and Audit Design - The Importance of Being Earnest," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100577, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Hugh-Jones, David, 2016. "Honesty, beliefs about honesty, and economic growth in 15 countries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 99-114.
More about this item
Keywords
Lying; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie-detection; Experiment;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-03-25 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)
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