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Communication Between Rational Agents

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Fehr, Dietmar, 2011. "The persistance of "bad" precedents and the need for communication: A coordination experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2011-039, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  2. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  3. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2004. "Informal communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 180-200, August.
  4. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
  5. McGinn, Kathleen L. & Milkman, Katherine L. & Nöth, Markus, 2012. "Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 278-291.
  6. David Sally, 1995. "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 58-92, January.
  7. Andreas Blume, 1995. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9504002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 May 1996.
  8. Chan, Jimmy & Suen, Wing, 2009. "Media as watchdogs: The role of news media in electoral competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 799-814, October.
  9. Cassing, James & To, Ted, 2008. "Antidumping, signaling and cheap talk," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 373-382, July.
  10. Gary Charness & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez & Matthias Sutter, 2023. "An Experimental Study on the Effects of Communication, Credibility, and Clustering in Network Games," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1530-1543, November.
  11. Schlag, Karl H. & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Commitments, Intentions, Truth and Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 438, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  12. Adrian Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2014. "For those about to talk we salute you: an experimental study of credible deviations and ACDC," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 173-199, June.
  13. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 676-695, March.
  14. Ambrus, Attila, 2006. "Coalitional Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3200266, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  16. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2006. "Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634, Stockholm School of Economics.
  17. Antinyan, Armenak & Corazzini, Luca & D'Agostino, Elena & Pavesi, Filippo, 2023. "Watch your words: An experimental study on communication and the opportunity cost of delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 216-232.
  18. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  19. Kolmar, Martin, 2013. "Group Conflicts. Where do we stand?," Economics Working Paper Series 1331, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  20. Blume, Andreas & DeJong, Douglas V. & Kim, Yong-Gwan & Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2001. "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 79-120, October.
  21. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2000. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-16, March.
  22. Antić, Nemanja & Persico, Nicola, 2023. "Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 299-310.
  23. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
  24. Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999. "Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1999-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  25. Warneryd, Karl, 1992. "Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 295-300, July.
  26. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  27. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Truth or Consequences: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 116-130, January.
  28. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
  29. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-039 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Tsuyoshi Hatori & Hayeong Jeong & Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2014. "Regional learning and trust formation," Chapters, in: Charlie Karlsson & Börje Johansson & Kiyoshi Kobayashi & Roger R. Stough (ed.), Knowledge, Innovation and Space, chapter 8, pages 180-212, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  31. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
  32. Valley, Kathleen L. & Moag, Joseph & Bazerman, Max H., 1998. "'A matter of trust':: Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 211-238, February.
  33. Fehr, Dietmar, 2017. "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 106-122.
  34. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Offerman, Theo & Onderstal, Sander, 2015. "Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 14-25.
  35. Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2024. "Cheap talk with two-sided private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 97-118.
  36. Nick Harkiolakis, 2023. "The Cycle of Value The Cycle of Value -- A Conservationist Approach to Economics," Papers 2308.07185, arXiv.org.
  37. Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia & Brayan Snehider D�az, 2022. "Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 17-42.
  38. Melody Lo, 2021. "Language and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 49-92, July.
  39. Serra Garcia, M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Other publications TiSEM b0e6e06d-c2e1-4a79-b477-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  40. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  41. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
  42. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01960762, HAL.
  43. Eran Guse & M. C. Sunny Wong, 2022. "Communication and Learning: The Bilateral Information Transmission in the Cobweb Model," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 60(2), pages 693-723, August.
  44. Sally, David, 2005. "Can I say "bobobo" and mean "There's no such thing as cheap talk"?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 245-266, July.
  45. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-153/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  46. A. Matsui, 2010. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society," Levine's Working Paper Archive 536, David K. Levine.
  47. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Post-Print halshs-01960762, HAL.
  48. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  49. Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017. "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 147-161.
  50. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  51. Karl H. Schlag & Péter Vida, 2021. "Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 867-889, December.
  52. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
  53. repec:cdl:ucsdec:qt68d1t1xg is not listed on IDEAS
  54. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of Coalitional Rationality," Scholarly Articles 3204917, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  55. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  56. Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-055/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
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